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ABSTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL TRIAGE: THE CEVELOFMQ7T OF A
CESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY FOR
UNEERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF THE
COMPLEX. ORGANIZATION IN CHANGE
May 1988
RDCERICK J. BARTELL, B.S., THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
M.P.A., THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by:

Professor Norma Jean Anderson

After a general review of the dynamics of personal crisis and
change, a theory of hew ccnplex organizations decline into a crisis
state was developed.

The premise is that misalignment of dominant

elements work to establish a degenerative state.
the organization to become maladaptive.

Such a state causes

As the maladaptive condition

increases, change inhibitors begin to form.

The level of organiza¬

tional decline determines what inhibitor or combination of inhibitors
evolve.
The primary organizational change inhibitors identified are:
inappropriate defense patterns and defense mechanisms; traumatized
leadership; organizational blockages; and organizational syndromes.

As

misalignment increases, assisted by the negative coping mechanisms or
inhibitors, a point is reached where a state of disharmonic resonance
is established (the negative of synergy) and a crisis state is created
or organization utility equals zero.

v

This descriptive theory was then translated into a prescriptive
model of degenerative intervention called "organizational triage"
(OIR).

Triage refers to an efficient process of identification of the

most significant dominant elements that will have the greatest impact
on reversing the decline and the selection of the most appropriate
intervention protocol—salvage, treatment, or surgery—to realign these
dominant elements.
The degenerative intervention model identified seven major stages:
equilibrium misalignment occurrence, pre-crisis, crisis, stabilization,
regeneration, and new equilibrium.

The pre-crisis and crisis stages

were further broken into four phases.

Intervention and alignment

strategies and observations about the model were developed.

Special

enphasis was placed on the stabilization of an organization in crisis
as a triage ocnponent needed to prepare an organization to accept the
realignment intervention.
Last, a review of applications, and further areas of research and
conclusions were presented.
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CHAPTER 1

INIRDDUCTION

To place this dissertation effort into perspective, this student
has to go back to the year 1980.

As an external consultant for sane

eleven years to all types of organizations, several naggirg questions
started to surface.

Such questions included:

Why do certain

consultant interventions seem to work so well when the same
intervention is rejected by an organization of seemingly similar
characteristics?

Why do managers who move fran cane organization to

another fail when they were a success in their preceding job?

What

role does an organization's structure play in helping it to cope with
crisis situations?
different rates?

Why do organizations go out of business at
The list was growing rapidly.

As me progressed frcm research assistant to staff consultant, to
associate consultant, to managing one's own consulting firm, learning
about the dynamics of organizational behavior, especially those in
crisis, became of predominant interest.
excellent,

Tricil and error had been an

if expensive, teacher and the student new wanted to more

formally study the various theories and organizational dynamics to
determine if indeed an organizational theory did exist that cculd be
applied with consistent results in an organizational crisis type
setting.
It was during the search for an opportunity to formally study
organizational behavior that the student was introduced to
organizational development, often labeled O.D.

1

Hus approach to
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looking at the organizational intervention or change process gave this
student hope that a process for treating organizations in crisis
already existed and just needed to be located.
his doctoral ccnirdttee, the search began.

Under the guidance of

After an initial, but rather

rigorous literature review, it was found that little attention had been
given to understanding ocmplex organizations in crisis, let alone
identification of the most effective treatment processes.

The search

had now turned into a long-term, tedious process of mining mountains of
writings and research on organizational theory, organizational
behavior, organizational development processes, psychology of the
individual as related to handling personal crisis, and studies of
organizational decline.

The purpose was to glean the nuggets of

relevant information that would later became the basis from which a
crisis theory and intervention process would be developed in this
dissertation.
This tedious, time consuming process of searching the literature
and developing a theory about complex organizations in crisis yielded
an unanticipated benefit.

The published writings most recently

appearing [Ackerman (December, 1986); Brain and Strategy (December,
1986); Sutton, Eisenhart, and Jucker (Spring, 1986); Meyers (1986);
Kets de Vries and Miller (1985); and Fink (1986)] are giving
confirmation to the theory and treatment processes that have been
developed during the last three years by this student.
An initial review of the literature about organizational
development (O.D.) processes, especially in the most closely related
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area of organizational change and transformation technologies, yielded
an interesting observation.

When the O.D. materials and processes

reviewed were critically analyzed from this student's extensive client
experience perspective, it was felt that these O.D. interventions and
processes were being developed for a whole different set of ccnplex
organizations that were almost foreign to this student's experience.
Having consulted with well over six hundred different client
organizations representing a wide portion of the organizational
spectrum consisting of local and state governments, utilities,
hospitals, manufacturing and processing plants, research and
development organizations, high-tech electronic defense contractors,
service industries, school districts, and training organizations; this
student found this to be disconcerting.

When one attempted to fit the

O.D. technologies into the client experience base, it was found that
the O.D. technologies seemed to apply most readily where the
organizations were operating within the norms or standards for that
particular industry.

However, when the client organization or a

particular department of the client organization was operating outside
of the industrial norm—either high growth or decline—the O.D.
technologies did not seem applicable nor would they have been
acceptable to the client sponsor of the consultation effort.

The

problem was most pronounced in organizations that were in an admitted
crisis mode of operation.

Typically, exanples of this crisis mode

existed where the organization was:

on the brink of bankruptcy; under

heavy public, legal, and/or employee assault; in a very volatile market
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or where there were significant changes either in increased or
decreased demand for services, and/or where the ccnpet it ion for scarce
resources and market share was intense and not anticipated.
The result of this ccnparative effort enabled this student to
formulate three distinct organizational intervention classifications.
Using these classifications, this student was able to place his
consultant experience into perspective and relate to the experience of
others as discussed in the literature.
It is easiest to understand the three intervention classifications
when one thinks of them in terms of a spectrum of organizational
utility.

The spectrum is defined as the range of the effectiveness the

organizational elements can achieve to meet the goals of the
organization through the interaction and application of its elements.
The spectrum is divided into three portions.

The left side is

classified as Hi^i-Tech Management (HIM) or requires high-tech
intervention strategy.

The middle portion of the spectrum is the more

traditional Organizational Develcpmerrt Intervention (O.D.), and the
right side of the spectrum is classified as Organizational Triage
Intervention (CTTR).

(See Figure 1 on page 5.)

Hie greater the synergy yielded by the organizational state, the
further to the left of the spectrum an organization is placed.

This

far left part of the spectrum would be typified as the high growth or
development portion.

An organization that is operating with sane

effectiveness, but within the normal range for its industry as
expressed by the operating ratios and other indicators for that
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industry, is placed in the center of the spectrum.

The type of

organizations that would fit in this portion would be normal growth,
slew growth, maintenance, and even bureaucratic service organizations.
Clearly the greatest number of organizations would fit into this
portion of the spectrum.

The third type of organization, on the far

right portion of the spectrum, is identified as in decline, where the
organization is not synergistic and where the organization will not
survive in its current state.

When organizations are placed on this

spectrum, it is most probable that the distribution would resenble a
typical bell shaped curve (see figure 1).

The intervention

classifications are then matched to these three portions of the
spectrum.

★Organizational alignment/utility index
FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL UTILITY SPECIRJM

Along the spectrum is the "organizational alignment utility
index."

This index, explained more fully in Chapter 3, is an index of

synergy being produced from a specific organization state.

As can be
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seen in figure 1 on page 5, this index can be expressed as a
percentage.
100%.

The percentage range for normal operations is from 0 to

Organizations which fall within this percentage range can

benefit from standard organizational development intervention.

The HIM

portion of the spectrum would range from over one hundred percent
efficiency to some unknown high percentage.

The intervals of the HIM

portion of the spectrum would be minimally stated as an increasing
geometric progression, and the intervals of the OTR portion would be
minimally stated as a negative geometric progression.

The index drops

off very rapidly once the organization or organizational unit drops
below zero.

It is this critical drop that often immobilizes the

management of the organization to act proactively to cxxmter the
degeneration of the organization or seme segment of the organization;
the result being a triage type intervention (most often an external
intervention) is required to stabilize the organization and reverse the
decline or a severe crisis state will develop.
When this student compared his experience with a review of the
O.D. literature, he found he was most often consulting at the extreme
right side of the spectrum in terms of intervention.

Therefore, it

herein* clear why the traditional theories, management intervention
models, techniques, and strategies, when applied to this lew extreme,
would most often yield unreliable and unsatisfactory results.

Simply,

they are not developed to address the lew end of this spectrum.
Kimberly, Miles, and Associates write:

"Very few contaiporary studies

of organizational development focus on the decline and termination of
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organizations.

.

.

.

Moreover, people in general, and especially the

young scholars in the nascent field of organizational behavior, are
prone to push the reality of death from their day-to-day
consciousness.I,JThe complexion of today's complex organizations sets up the
condition to foster crisis.

Curtis P. McLaughlin writes:

"The result

of the short time horizon in the public sector can be a pattern of
'crisis management'.

That is the result of attempting to fight fires

as they arise, especially when the result is attention to detail and
not to strategy or the development of an effective system."* 2
However, Kimberly, et al, argue that the literature in public
administration has at least addressed the decline of organizations and
referenced several authors that address the issues of organizational
decline.3
Ichak Adizes in his treatise "Organizational Passages - Diagnosing
and Treating Lifecycle Problems of Organizations" developed a lifecycle
for organizations and explained how to short-circuit premature
mortality on numerous organizational passages by suggesting various
"treatments."
courtship,

Through the first seven organizational passages:

infancy, go-go, adolescence, prime, maturity, and

Ijchn R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The
Organizational Life Cycle (San Francisco, California:
Jossey-Bass
Inc., Publishers,

1981), p. 439.

2 Curt is P. Mclaughlin, The Management of Non-Profit Organizations
(New York:

John Wiley and Sons, 1986), pp. 31-32.

3Kintoerly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle,
p. 364.
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aristocracy; he suggested O.D. type interventions.

With early

bureaucracy, he suggested that "prompt surgical treatment is usually
necessary."

He went on to state regarding bureaucracy and death of an

organization, "I have had no experience with treating these types of
organizations."4
Kimberly, Miles, and Associates write;

"Starbuck, Greve, and

Hedberg (1978) propose that a special decision-making taskforce be
formed to address issues of decline,"5

and recommended "a 'crisis

corps' that rely primarily on informal power and informal communication
channels."6

They go on to write this team would;

"determine the

severity of the crisis, present alternative courses of action and, in
general, prepare the organization to 'weather exit the storm.'"7
Kimberly, et al, further cite Boulding as writing;

"... a cadre

of consultants who specialize in the management of declining
organizations would be extremely useful.

These people would be called

into organizations in shock much as Red Adair is called into oil fields
on fire."8

It is with great interest that this student read this

remark as he has coined the term of "organizational triage team" and

4Ichak Adizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations", Organizational Dynamics (New
York;

American Management Association, Sumner 1979), p. 22.
SKiittoerly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle,

p. 364.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
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has been developing and directing such a team for several years which
spawned his interest in further developing an organizational crisis
theory.
Donald Bibeault cites several authors who suggest organizations
have a normal growth curve (Greiner, 1972 and Starbuck, 1965) and that
when deviation becomes too great, correction is impossible and the
system suffers irremediable damage.

The period just before the

irremediable damage is the crisis period.

Donald B. Bibeault writes,

"Seme companies need emergency treatment until their condition is
stabilized and more refined evaluations can take place"9.

This is a

classic action definitial of organizational triage.
Gerald C. Meyers (former chairman of American Motors) writes in
his recent book:
"Wartime physicians have developed a crisis management
system that allocates scarce resources so that they will do
the most good.
It is a brutal, but effective system called
triage.
As the wounded are brought in for treatment, they
are immediately classified into three groups:
1)
2)
3)

the superficially wounded;
the hopelessly wounded;
the seriously wounded who have a chance for survival.

It is the last who get most of the attention, because they
can benefit the most from medical care."10

9Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate Turrarcund - Hew Managers Turn
losers into Winners (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 96
10Gerald C. Meyers, When It Hits the Fan (Boston:
Mifflin Company,

1986), p. 6.

Houghton
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He goes on to conclude:

"Business has something to learn from

this stem discipline and from the techniques that have been developed
to manage illness with modem facilities and techniques."11
The literature review and more specifically Bibeault's and Meyers'
statements reaffirm that this student is on the right track with the
focus of this dissertation.

The purpose of this dissertation effort is

as follows:
1)

Raise the level of interest, and therefore, awareness of the
phenomenon of organizations' behavior in crisis;

2)

Specifically describe the parameters, factors, and
interactions of an organization in crisis so a theoretical
base can be formed on which further research can be launched;

3)

Provide an interim understanding of the dynamics of
organizations in crisis so that the organizational manager and
consultant can better tailor existing diagnostic and
intervention processes to deal with organizations in crisis
until better processes are developed, tested, and documented;

4)

Identify and meld specific concepts and organizational
theories into a usable model that can be applied and refined
by others to form an application base for future development
of crisis management technology.

11Ibid.

CHAPTER 2
IERSCNAL CRISIS THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THEORY: A
BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONAL
CRISIS THEORY AND INTERVENTION MOCEL

Personal crisis theory developed by the discipline of psychiatry,
althcuc^i not a complete or perfect model for understanding ccrplex
organizations in crisis, does suggest a framework and perspective for
developing an organizational crisis model.

The personal crisis theory,

as presented here, was used by this student in developing his model.
This chapter looks at same basic elements of personal crisis theory as
well as seme organizational change theories that could possibly be
adapted to the ccrplex organization in crisis.

As these crisis

theories are analyzed and placed into a ccrplex organizational
perspective, a philosophical basis for the development of a ccrplex
organizational crisis theory and intervention model evolves.

Working Definitials
For purposes of this dissertation the more traditional definition
of theory, stated as:

"a coherent group of general propositions used

as principles of explanation for a class of phenomena,1,1 will be
expanded to include models, concepts, theorems, prepositions, and
hypotheses that attempt to describe, classify, and/or predict
organizational behavior.

1The American College Dictionary (New York:
Harper & Brothers, Publishers,

1953), p. 1,256.

11

Randan House, Inc.,
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Hie definition of organization, for this dissertation effort, also
goes beyond the formal definition of:

"a body of persons organized for

seme end or work; the administrative personnel or apparatus of a
business? or an organism."2

An organization will be defined as

. .

numerous systems . . . functioning together"3 to include such elements
or subsystems as administration, management, administrative behavior,
structure, work flows, reward structures, ccraiunication networks, role
structures, power relationships, feedback systems, and work cultures—
to name but just a few.
For purposes of this dissertation, the working definition used for
personal crisis is taken from Caplan.

Caplan defines personal crisis

as a state:
"provoked when a person faces an obstacle (hazard) to
important life goals that is for a time insurmountable
through the utilization of customary methods of problem¬
solving (coping behavior). A period of disorganization
ensues, a period of upset during which many abortive attempts
at solution are made."4

2Ibid., p. 854.
3con Hellriegel, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Richard W. Woodman,
cwwd^1-ional Behavior. 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing
Ccupany, 1983), p. 16.
4Gerald F. Jacobson, ed., New Directions for Mental Health
cervices (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1980), p.
citing Gerald Caplan, An Accroach to Catmjnity Mental Health (New
Grune & Stratton, 1961).

,
or
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Personal Crisis:—Theory. Concepts, and Elen^m-g
In his forward, Jacobson states that the basic concepts of
equilibrium, time, and change are essential to crisis theory.5

Gerald

Caplan theorizes that there are three key aspects that affect the
ability of a person to handle emotional strain.
1)

state of ego;

2)

stage of maturity;

3)

quality of its structure.6

These are:

He goes on to explain in more detail that the state of ego is really
the capacity of the person to withstand stress and anxiety and to
maintain ego equilibrium.

The stage of maturity is determined by the

degree of reality recognized and faced in solving problems.

The

quality of its structure is determined by the repertoire of effective
coping mechanisms employable by the person in maintaining the balance
in the psychobiosocial field.7
When the customary problem-solving techniques cannot be used to
meet the normal problems, the balance or equilibrium is upset.

The

individual must either solve the problem or adapt to non-solution.

In

either case, a new state of equilibrium will develop; be it positive or
negative.8

5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., pp. 5-6.
8Ibid., p. 6.
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Jacobson suggests that crisis theory specifically
process of change with an existing equilibrium.

the

Therefore, crisis

theory is not a comprehensive theory of human functioning and, as a
result, other bodies of knowledge must be looked at to define the
nature of equilibrium involved and the changes affecting that balance.
He suggests that the area of life events studies has attempted to merge
the area of psychoanalysis and the works of Freud and Erik Erickson
(1959) and sociology represented by Johnson (1960)
crisis theory.

into a functioned

He cites numerous studies—Brown (1974); Holmes and

Rahe (1967); Myers, Lindenthal, and Pepper (1975); Paykel (1971, 1974,
1975); and Rahe (1974).9
As an example of such a life event approach, Holmes and Rahe
(1967) constructed a "Social Readjustment Rating Scale" composed of
forty-three events.

Each event was weighted (death, divorce, and jail

term-rated a five on the scale), and the total score was suggested to
be associated with mental health and the ability to cope.10
Jacobson's crisis process model makes the assunptions that;
(1) crisis phenomena follow a specific sequence;
HicrHvrKoH by a "life event"

(2) equilibrium can be

(this could include a social, physical,

physiological, economic, etc., area which is interpreted as a hazard);
(3) crisis is time-limited; and (4) after new ccping efforts occur, a
new equilibrium is established.

The model generated is shewn in

9Ibid., p. 4.
lCVp. R. Holmes and R. H. Rahe, "The Social Readjustment Rating
Scale," Journal

of Psychosomatic Research, 1967, pp. 212 - 218.
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diagram form in table 1.

Coping in this model is defined to include

both adaptive and maladaptive behaviors.

In either case, if sustained

coping maintains or reestablishes a state of equilibrium.

TABLE 1
THE CRISIS SEQUENCE11

Time
Sequence

Nonpsychological Area
(Social, Physical,
Physiological)

1

Many Factors

Life Event occurs

Interaction

Psychological
Area

Ongoing smooth
interaction

Equilibrium

Life event
interpreted as
hazard

Equilibrium
disturbed

Attempts at
coping fail
State of
crisis ensues
New coping
established
Many Factors

Ongoing smooth
interaction

Equilibrium

The theory also includes the term "chronic crisis" which refers to
an individual or organizational style of behavior that can induce
crisis in other individuals or organizational parts craning into contact
with them.

The unique characteristic is that this chaotic mode of

operation acts as a stabilizing mechanism in the actor, and the actor
would be thrown into crisis only if this style was interrupted.

HJacobson,

New Directions for Mental Health Services, p. 5.

Time
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is a limiting force in that prolonged personal crisis is not tolerable;
it is entropic in nature and will cease to exist or die.12
Of the various developed stress response models and theories
reviewed, the Horowitz (1976) model seems the most concise and relevant
for the purposes of this dissertation.
stages of stress response.

This crisis model presents six

If the situation is normally responded to

without blockage, intensification or negative reaction from an
inoperative adaptive mechanism, the stages progress from:

event,

outcry, denial, intrusion, working through, and couplet ion.

A faulty

stress response can occur at any stage with crisis producing results or
manifestations.

Hie model is shown in figure 2 on page 17.13

For further clarification between the denial and intrusiveness
phases, table 2, found on page 18, presents behavior manifestation.
Needless to say, there could be some direct transference of these
phases to organizations with seme refinement.
Seme theories of personal change triggered by crisis events also
provide some additional insight into hew individuals and ultimately
organizations can react to and cope with stress.

Kubler's (1969)

acceptance sequence of deeding with death suggested four phases.
denial—anger—bargaining

acceptance.1

12Ibid., pp. 6-8.
13m. j. Horowitz and Nancy B. Kaltreider, "Brief Treaty°f
Post-Tramatic Stress Disorders," New Directions
Services. ed. Gerald F. Jacobson (San Francisco, California. Jossey
pacag Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 69.

14Kubler-Ross, E., on rv^th and Dying (New York:
1969), pp. 18-41.
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DENIAL AND INTELJSIVENESS FHASES

Denial Fhast*

Intrusiveness Fhase

Perception and
Attention

Daze
Hypervigilance, startle
Selective inattention
reactions
Inability to appreciate
Sleep and dream
significance of stimuli
disturbance

Consciousness

Amnesia (complete or
partial)
Nonexperience

Ideation
Processing

Disavowal of meanings
Overgeneralization
of stimuli
Inability to concentrate
loss of reality
on other topics,
appropriacy
preocupation
Constriction of
Confusion and disorganassociational width
ization
Inflexibility of
organization of thought
Fantasies to counteract
reality

Emotional

Numbness

Emotional attacks or pangs

Somatic

Tension-inhibition type
synptcms

Synptcmatic sequel of
chronic fight or flight
readiness (of
exhaustion)

Actions

Frantic overac±ivity to
withdrawal

Search for lost persons
and situations,
compulsive repetitions

Intrusive-repetitive
thoughts and behaviors
(illusions, pseudohallucinations, night¬
mares, ruminations, and
repetitions)

SOURCE: M. J. Horowitz and Nancy B. Kaltreider, "Brief Treatment
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders," New Directions for Mental Hea
Services, ed. Gerald F. Jacobson (San Francisco, California: JosseyBass Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 70.
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Kelly and Conner (1980) also suggested a sequence of emotional
phases for accepting change.

These phases were:

ihase I or uninformed

optimism (certainty); Ihase II or informed pessimism (doubt); Phase hi
or hopeful realism (hope); Ihase IV or informed optimism (confidence) ;
and Phase V or rewarding completion (satisfaction) ,15
Bcwlby suggests the literature discerns four general stages of
mourning (crisis process) to be:
"1.

"2.
"3.
"4.

Phase of numbing that usually lasts from a few hours to
a week and may be interrupted by outbursts of extremely
intense distress and/or anger.
Ihase of yearning and searching for the lost figure
lasting seme norths and sometimes for years.
Phase of disorganization and despair.
Phase of greater or lesser degree of reorganization."16

In suntnary, these classifications, breakdowns or phases identified for
the "working through" of personal crises, mourning, and personal
change, suggest such a breakdown would be useful for understanding
complex organizations in crisis.

Intervention Strategies for Crisis Reduction
In the middle 1960's, the term crisis intervention was not yet
included in psychiatric dictionaries.

This is significant considering

that psychiatry is the most advanced discipline to deal with the
concept of crisis.

In 1970, in the fourth edition of Hinsie's

Psychiatric Dictionary, the term crisis intervention is one of the

15Don Kelley and Daryl R. Conner, The Emotional Cycle of Change
(Atlanta, Georgia: O.D. Resources Press, 1980).
16Manfred F. R. Rets de Vries and Danny Miller, The Neurotic
Organization (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1985), p. 155
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several inodes of cxcirunity psychiatry mentioned.

It states further

that "the crisis intervention model . . . demands novel adaptional
responses."17
Current pure crisis theory, with regard to personal crisis,
indicates that the personal crisis will be solved by time alone as the
human cannot sustain a state of severe crisis.

Therefore, personal

crisis intervention strategies are designed only to help maximize the
level of functioning after the crisis has ended or for damage control.
When looking at techniques in crisis intervention, Edwards makes
the following points:

(1) one cannot effectively counsel or provide

therapy intervention when the client is in a crisis state; (2) when a
client is off-balance, one must study the client before addressing the
problem;

(3) one cannot give advice in a counseling situation; and

(4) there are three points of intervention—pre-crisis state, crisis
state, and post-crisis state.

The earlier the intervention, the more

predictable the results and the less effort required.18
The author further suggests the "ABC Method" of intervention as
follows:
Step A:

Counselor acquires information and rapport with client.

Step B:

Counselor boils down the information acxjuired into a
well-focused sentence of the problem statement.

17Donna C. Aquilera and Janice M. Messick, Crisis Intervention
Theory and Methodology. 2nd ed. (St. Iouis: C. V. Moseby Company,
1974), p. 6.
18Pcmaine V. Edwards f crisis Intervention and Hew it Works
(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1977), p. 11

Step C:

Counselor helps the client ape with the problem as
stated.
-

review alternatives;

-

get client ocmou.tment;

-

have client select choice of coping mechanism that
makes the most sense to the client and that the client
can buy into.19

She suggests that time is a helper as well as a problem generating
scuroe.

Horcwitz also suggests timing as an important ingredient of

crisis intervention.

He illustrates this point with the exairple, shown

in table 3 on page 22, of the timing of a brief crisis intervention
(focused in this case on psychotherapy) ,20

As a consultant, this

student most state that table 3—the timing and activities—are very
similar to the process he has used with successful organizational
consultations he has provided to organizations in crisis.
Ruriloff suggests a number of intervention techniques that could
be used, although it is recognized that these can be used for non¬
crisis type interventions as well.
-

organizational feedback;

-

sensing meetings;

-

"organization mirror";

-

subsidiary techniques;

These include:

19Ibid., p. 16.
20Horowitz and Kaltrider, "Brief Treatment of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorders," p. 72.
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-

subgrcuping for problem identification;

-

"fishbowl";

-

role play;

-

case studies;

-

tape recording feedback (video and audio);

-

active listening;

-

force field analysis.21

He suggests the latter for diagnosing an existing situation and
establishing the point where one of the other interventions should be
used.

Briefly, the concept suggests a state of social stability or

desired equilibrium when the "driving forces" that exert positive
pressure for change and the "restraining forces" that resist change are
equal.

However, group life is never static since feelings, ecological

factors, presence, or absence of individuals, etc., constantly change.
Therefore, the term "quasi-stationary equilibrium" is used in force
field analysis to determine the "real" equilibrium at any given time.
See figure 3 on page 24.
Force field analysis is used to direct where the effort
(intervention) should be placed to cause the change.
intervention with this approach are threefold.

The points of

First, one or more of

the restraining forces could be lessened; second, one or both of the
driving forces could be lessened; or third, a combination of one and
two could be employed.

21 Arthur A. Kuriloff, Organizational Development for Survival
(American Management Association, Inc., 1972), pp. 125 - 158.

H) O
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Restraining Forces
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Driving Forces

SCXJPCE: Arthur H. Kuriloff, Organizational Development for
Survival (New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1972), p.
135.
FIGURE 3
FORCE FIELD ANALYSIS
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Hie author suggests that as a general rule it is more productive
to reduce restraining forces to "unfreeze" a situation than to increase
the driving force.22

To increase the driving force can lead to

increased tension and act to inflame resistance,

in crisis

intervention, increasing the driving force has the opposite desired
effect of reducing the chaos.

This approach of reducing the

restraining forces allows for a host of possible intervention
strategies.
The discipline of psychiatry seems to have cans the farthest in
developing approaches for dealing with crisis, but the focus is on the
individual, not the organization.

This is understandable for the

intervention process for the individual in crisis is not as complex an
intervention process (although it may be as severe and intense or even
more so) as the organization in crisis.

This statement is made for the

following reasons, based on the experience this student has in
consulting.
1).

Nature will not take care of the organizational crisis as
presented by Caplan (earlier in this chapter).

He suggests

that an individual cannot, by his/her own nature, tolerate a
crisis for long and is therefore time limited.

In the organ¬

izational setting, the crisis period can be longer.

This is

seen especially in the public sector where the public
requirement for service continues and the tax base supports
the organization.

22Ibid.

Under these circumstances, the organiza-

26
tion can truly survive longer in that it is not allowed to
die, and in sane cases, cannot die while a private
corporation can beams bankrupt and an individual can die.
2) .

Multiple crises can occur in an organization, but be masked
as one.

When an individual has been traumatized by an event

suds as a death in the family, assault, etc., and goes into a
crisis state, the crisis intervention specialist can more
easily identify the triggering event and intervene
accordingly.

The complex organization may be in crisis with

little understanding of the chain of events that caused the
crisis.

This practitioner has been able to identify as many

as five different crises operating in the same organization.
Sane of the crises were more intense because they were the
result of crises that were inadequately handled (they
inappropriately adapted to a non-solution) at an earlier
point in time.
3) .

The organizational groups that must be involved in the crisis
reduction process (the sponsor, change agent and target) do
not all experience the same level of crisis, and in sane
cases, have not yet reached a point of crisis; while others
cure inoperative due to their severe crisis state.

Therefore,

before intervention can be attempted, the intervener must
increase the awareness of the crisis situation without
increasing or spreading the crisis to new areas.

27
4) .

EMe to the complex nature of organizations, one has to often
affect five or more ancillary areas in order to reduce the
crisis in the target area.

It is not unlike a heart

operation where the surgeon must first cut the skin, spread
the rib cage, place the body on life support systems, etc.
The same is true of an organization, but with often more
aggressive (and vocal) resistance by the ancillary areas
being impacted by the intervention (treatment).
5) .

Knowing the crisis causing event allows for intervention
specialties to be formed (such as rape crisis centers).
These specialties enhance the skill of the interveners due to

•

constant exposure (trial and error), increase the level of
understanding, and ultimately establish a predictable
treatment process.

Needless to say, this extends the

recognition of the discipline.

This recognition, in itself,

has a calming effect on the individual in crisis knowing that
the intervener is competent, can empathize with the crisis
being experienced, and will not become traumatized by working
with the crisis.

Organizational consulting is years away

from achieving this level of competent expertise and
recognition.

This will remain so until better diagnostic

tools are available to identify the source of the crisis.
6).

Individuals involved as clients in crisis counseling no
longer carry the same social stigma that they once did.
Today stress leaves, bio-feedback, employee assistance

28
programs, etc., are becoming accepted and as respected as
physical exercising, dieting, or other self helps.

Many

corporate organizations operate in a highly competitive
environment where the term "survival of the fittest" is
internalized.

Even to suggest there is a crisis could open

up the organization to become the prey of their competitors,
affect the purchase of stock, erode the confidence of the
consumer in the product's integrity, etc.

in seme cases,

organizations aggravate the crisis by taking courses of
action that would indicate they are not having a crisis?
increasing their physical plant, hiring staff, etc., to prove
to those watching (internally and externally) that all is
well.

This crisis denied, characteristic of organizations

affects the treatment process in the following ways:
a) .

The organization does not call the consultant in until
it is almost or beyond rehabilitation.

This situation

then requires dramatic, high-risk solutions that often
cause secondary crises due to the short time frame
available to "ready" the organization for treatment.
b) .

The organization does not recognize the value of the
consultant service, and therefore, under-budgets the
corrective process.

Often this results in cutting

comers on the diagnosis so more treatment time can be
given or materials purchased.

29
c) .

The sponsor never becomes canaitted or internalizes the
crisis as his/her problem, but instead calls it "their"
problem.

The sponsor's overt support is required in

most cases to ensure the treatment "takes" and is not
rejected by the organization once the consultant leaves.
d) .

A true discipline is difficult to develop because the
learned lessons are taken from information and
experience gathered which cannot be shared openly due to
this climate of ccrpetition and mistrust.

7).

The ccnplexity of working with an organization to intervene
effectively to reduce crisis is so great that a senior
consultant cannot work with more than six to fifteen
organizations a year.

Therefore, the learning curve will

take years longer to develop predictable intervention methods
because seldom are any two crises caused by the same type of
event, let alone similarities in the organizational make-up
and constraints.
Although brief in description, these described differences are
real and directly irrpede the successful and easy development of a
crisis organizational theory and intervention model.

Organizational change from a Crisis Perspective
This student's next step was to make the transition from the
personal crisis literature to an organizational crisis focus.

As an

extension of Jacobsen's basic three concepts essential to personal

30
crisis theory-equilibrium, time, and chanje^-a statanent could be
adapted to say organizations have three variables that are Host
sensitive to crisis.

These are:

1)

propensity to maintain a state of equilibrium;

2)

stage in development;

3)

capacity for structural change (flexibility).

Table 4, found on page 31, diagrams one useful model of the stages
of homeostasis development or equilibrium.24

As shown, there are four

basic phases that an organization or individual must evolve through in
order for homeostasis to occur.
phases of mourning.25

The concept evolves from Bowlby's four

Once homeostasis occurs—the result of the

organizational triage intervention process—the stage is set for
change.

In other words, a climate is established which gives an

organization the ability to adapt to changing conditions.

Premature

exiting or not completing any me of these phases causes the
homeostasis state to be less than fully realized.
The steps of the degeneration and ultimate regeneration process
have been labeled by several theorists, seme most recently.

These

breakdowns are compared in table 5 found on page 32.
Rets de Vries and Miller broke the process of degenerationregeneration into seven parts:

equilibrium; stress event or trigger

event where homeostasis is disturbed; shock; disbelief or denied;

23Jacobson, New Directions for Mental Health Services, p. 2.
24Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 163.
25Ibid., p. 155.

TABLE 4

31

STAGES OF HCMEOSTASIS EEVELOFMENT
[Triggering
EVent (s) ]
Individual Manager/Employee
Fhase I: Shock
Numbing, interrupted by panic,
outbursts of anger

Organization

I

State of disarray; organizational
process canes to a halt or becomes
ritualistic, a feeling event can
still be undone

1

Fhase II: Disbelief
Yearning and searching for what
is lost; disbelief, denial of
reality; irrational anger; selfreproach, sadness; insannia or
extensive sleeping

Fhase III: Discarding
Despair; disorganization;
discarding or old patterns of
feeling, and acting;
redefinition of oneself

I

i

Fhase IV: Realization
Reshaping of internal represent¬
ational world; acceptance of new
reality and values, beliefs and
thoughts
Achieved Condition:

I

Fight/flight; search for omnipotent
leader; dependency need manifests as
passivity; internal politics
increase—use of protective
behavior; source of blame sought;
longing for return to status quo
("good ole days"); search for what
is lost

Rethinking or extinguishing of old
old goals and objectives; thinking,
motivational needs restated in less
complexity; acceptance of organiza¬
tional situation; occasional flight
behavior; redefinition of situation;
tentative explorations; pre-testing

Reorganization: proactive posture;
future orientation; explanation of
process and justification developed
(after-the-fact)

Homeostasis

SOURCE: Manfred F. R. Rets de Vries and Danny Miller, The
ftoimtic organization: Diagnosing and Changing Counterproductive
Styles of Management (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc.,
Fhblishers, 1985), p. 163.
NOTE: These stages are the same for developing homeostasis after
a change has been initiated or to compensate for stress causing,
triggering event, or stimuli that dictates a change is required.
Whether an OD or CTO process is used depends on the intensity,
tenacity, and persistence of the situation.
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discarding; realization; and new homeostasis achieved.

This model was

adapted from Bowlby's "phases of mourning" and incorporates the factor
of a trigger event or significant disturbing of the homeostasis.26
This student has observed this phenomenon in several consultations.
The trigger acts to coalesce management temporarily which allows a
threshold to be met that calls collective attention to the problem.
All of a sudden a majority realizes the organization is out of control
and shocik follows.

This part of the model is especially useful to the

development of this theory; in particular, how to initiate the
turnaround phase; and is discussed later.
Jacobson, in his "crisis process model,"27 has a six stage model.
These stages are:

equilibrium; equilibrium disturbed; attempts of

coping fail; state of crisis ensues; new coping established; and
equilibrium.

This is very descriptive of the deterioration process.

Ackerman, in her "transformation change model" suggests six steps.
These are:

birth; growth; plateau; chaos; death; and re-emergence.28

She uses a chart to describe this process which is not unlike what this
student developed a few years earlier.

Her re-emergence is the "new

equilibrium" and "new homeostasis achieved," as discussed in the other
models above.

However, her term suggests possibly a new organization

26Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 159 163.
27Gerald F. Jacobson, ed., New Directions for Mental Health
Services, p. 5.
28Linda S. Ackerman, "Development, Transition or Transformation:
The Question of Change in Organizations," OP Practitioner, December
1986, pp. 1-8.
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is evolved which this student questions if it is really the recycling
back to "birth."

If this is the case, it is not a phase of

transformation, but the beginning of a new organizational entity.
Meyers, in his "unmanaged crisis sequence," is helpful in that he
breaks the crisis sequence into three stages:
post-crisis.

pre-crisis, crisis, and

He suggests a sequence of three sub-stages or observable

manifestations exists for each of these three stages.

The pre-crisis

stage has the sequence of non-performance which results in denial or
recrimination and lastly evolves into anger or fear.

The crisis stage

starts with failure, moves to panic, and results in collapse.

The

post-crisis stage begins with shock which creates uncertainty and
evolves into radical change.29
This model is helpful in that the stage sequences are observable
dimensions.

It also verified the three stages that this student had

identified several years earlier with his work with organizations in
crisis.

It was a welcome support and verification for this independent

work effort.

However, this model, as well as the others, does not go

far enough in explaining the dynamics of how the deterioration occurs
and is reversed.
Bibeault, in his "stages of turnaround" was most helpful in this
regard.

He proposes that there are seven stages of turnaround.

stages are:

These

the decline stage, the unprofitable stage, the change of

management stage, the evolution stage, the emergency stage, the

29Gerald C. Meyers, When it Hits the Fan: Managing the Nine
Crises of Business (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pp. 24 25.
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stabilization stage, and lastly, the return-to-nonnal growth stage.30
Although this model was developed independently of this student's work,
it is the closest description of what this student has experienced in
his work with rehabilitating organizations in crisis.

For

of

understanding, this student took Bibeault's descriptions of the stages
of turnaround and placed them in matrix form.
(see page 36).

This is found in table 6

As constructed, one can easily carpare both

horizontally and vertically the various stages and their differences.
Bibeault was one of the few authors to discuss in any detail the
emergency stage approach of stopping the bleeding, initiating
turnaround leverage, and performing surgery as necessary.

Bibeault, in

his stages of turnaround model (see table 6), discussed the stages from
four perspectives:

corporate turnaround cycle, people motivation

cycle, focus of effort, and approach.

Each had seven different parts

to correspond with the seven stages.31
In the first stage or decline stage, the people motivation is
labeled "deterioration" with the focus of effort still being "business
as usual."

The approach taken at this stage is just "passive

maintenance."
The second stage being the "unprofitable stage," causes
"demoralization" of the members with the focus of the effort new

30Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround - Hew Managers Turn
Losers Into Winners (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 96.
31Ibid, pp. 91 - 109; 158 - 162; 182 - 199; 251 - 262.
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"oonoem."

Hie approach occurring at this point is increased

awareness.
The third stage is the "change^f-management stage" where the
people motivation cycle becomes one of a "honeymoon" with the new
management where individuals are hopeful that the solution has been
found.

The focus of the effort is on "assessment of the situation" and

"new leader selection."

The approach taken at this point in the

turnaround is labeled the "moment of truth" where management must
recognize that to go on further with the current leadership will not
resolve the declining situation.

Also at this stage the approach

includes "new leader identification" and "star selection" or the
selection of the person to lead the turnaround.
The fourth stage is the "evolution stage" where the ''honeymoon"
cycle continues in terms of how the stage inpacts the organizational
members.

The focus of the effort now becomes a "search for a viable

company core" (of product or service) and a search for a "turnaround
leverage point" or "points" as may be available.
threefold:

The approach used is

"problem identification," "solution action plan design,"

and "plan cx*rmunicaticns to those with power to implement."
The fifth stage is the emergency stage where the organizational
members are neutral as to the possible outcome of the turnaround.

The

focus of effort is on "retrenchment," "correction," "movement," and not
cm motivation.

The approach used typically includes:

"stepping the

bleeding" or where the corporate dollars are being wasted; initiating
the turnaround leverage? and conducting "surgery" as necessary or the

38
removal of organizational members or work units that are impeding the
success of the organization.
Ihe sixth stage is the "stabilization stage" where people now
become cctimitted to the new organizational turnaround state.

The focus

of the effort is new on "controlled profit growth" and "consistency."
The approach is "looking beyond today" to "protect the motherlode" or
the primary profit center and to "reposture the company"

as

now on the

way to recovery.
The last stage of corporate turnaround is the "return-to-growth"
stage.

The people motivation cycle is "enthusiasm," with the focus of

effort now being "development and growth revenue."

The approach

applied here is "strategic planning."
Kurt Lewin's (1958) simple model of change (see figure 4) is also
in concert with the theories mentioned previously.

unfreezing

Present
State
(solid)

refreezing

(creating the
motivation to
change)

- Equilibrium -

Transition
State
(liquid)

(stabilizing
integrating
changes)

- Disequilibrium -

Desired
State
(solid)
- Equilibrium -

FIGURE 4
LEWIN'S CHANGE MDDEL?2

32K. Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change," Social Psychology,
E. E. Maoooby, T. N. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds. (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 23 - 27.
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As just discussed, the material of these theorists is useful as a
point of reference and perspective when developing a ocnplex

CHAPTER 3
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONAL » 3«3> DERATION:

THE THEORY

This student's work with hundreds of complex organizations at
various stages of degeneration has allowed this student to select,
study, test, accept, or reject a wide number of operational
organizational theories and concepts from a field application
perspective.

The result of this effort concluded that no one theory,

when reviewed and applied in real case settings, was consistently
predictive and descriptive of the complex organizational degeneration
process.

The task was then to develop such a theory of crisis.

The

theory is developed as follows.

Concept of Alignment:

The Theory's Cornerstone

Simply, complex organizations are made up of dominant and
recessive elements that interact in various ways with one another.
Traditional organizational theories are an attempt to describe these
various interactions, often called organization behaviors or
organizational dynamics.

As these elements align with one another for

a given purpose, one has the basic configuration or definition of an
organization.

The greater the number of elements interacting the more

complex is the resulting "organization."

Therefore, the cornerstone of

the theory of organizational crisis starts with the term "alignment."
In Rowe and Mason's recent book, Managing with Style, they write.
"How each individual confronts the external world and
responds to the four forces [personal needs, environmental
pressures, task requirements, and group demands] is
determined by his or her cognitive complexity and
40
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environmental propensity. We consider an individual in
'alignment,' or in a state of equilibrium, when cognitive
complexity and environmental propensity are appropriately
related to the demands imposed by the four primary forces."1
Ihe tern

"alignment," as used in this dissertation, exists when

the interaction of two or more organizational elements produces a state
of equilibrium.

When the elements sue maximally aligned they will be

"synergistic" or the output of the elements is greater collectively
than the sum of the outputs of the elements taken individually.
Therefore, two plus two is more than four in a synergistic situation.
The opposite effect can also be predicted in that the lack of
alignment can create a state of organization disequilibrium and
uncertainty where the organization cannot cope or effectively use
customary methods to bring the organization back into equilibrium.

The

result being the organization spirals downward into an ever-increasing
crisis state as attempts at solution fail.

Degree of Alignment Expressed as the Utility Index
The utility of a complex organization is then directly related to
the level of alignment present between its elements.

This utility can

be expressed as an organizational alignment or utility index.

A formal

definition would be a qualitative description which may be a number
used for descriptive/ comparison purposes, that implies the amount of
utility a particular level of organizational alignment can provide to
meet the mission/goals (s)/objective(s) of the organization.

In other

iAlan J. Rowe and Richard 0. Mason, Managing with Style: A Guide
to understanding. Assessing, and Improving Decision Makjjjg (San
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1987), P- 6 •
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words, as the alignment of the organizational elements increases, the
organization becomes more actualized (increased utility) as a delivery
system to aocotplish a predetermined mission/goal/cbjective.

The

greater the utility index score, the greater the probability that the
purpose will be accorplished through the particular organizational
alignment configuration.
As the utility index increases, the efficiency or ratio of the
effective or useful output to the total input in the organization2 also
increases.

This utility index can be placed in chart form as seen in

figure 5 on page 43.

As shown, the utility index is placed into a

spectrum with four operating bands.

Point "B" on the spectrum is the

point where the useful output to the total input cost is equal.

As one

moves toward point "C," the useful output to the total input decreases
to a point where there is significantly greater cost being expended to
achieve the output.
bands.

This part of the spectrum covers both high and low

The decrease in these two bands is suggested to be linear by

this student.

If one would distribute the modem day organizations

along this four band spectrum, one would find generally a normal
distribution, as presented in figure 1 found on page 5.
When one moves toward either end of the spectrum, "A" or "D," a
significant difference is noted.

An organization that has a high

utility index will be synergistic and the output of the elements will
be greater than the total input into the organization.

The greater the

2Paraphrased from: The American Heritage Dictionary (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), p. 440.
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alignment, the greater the synergy and a resulting greater utility
index score.

This part of the spectrum has been labeled the ultra-high

band.
A score less than zero or below point »C" has a low utility index
and will be moving towards a state of randanness or destructive
degeneration.

In this part of the spectrum, ultra low band, the

alignment of the elements actually absorbs and expends resources at a
greater rate than the total input provides.

Any productivity actually

"costs" the organization and acts to deplete reserves at an ever
increasing rate as one digresses along the spectrum towards point "D."
Point "D" is where maximum entropy or chaos, the negative of
organization, is fully formed.
Extensive experience of this student indicates that as the
organization moves beyond point "B" towards point "A," the synergistic
state seems to escalate at a much greater rate than the linear rate and
it is suggested that this rate of change towards mavimim synergy is
geometric.

The movement, or organizational degeneration, from point

"C" to point "D" also increases at a much more rapid rate, based on
degenerative measurements3 taken by this student of organizations
identified as operating at this end of the spectrum,

it is suggested

again that this ultra low band degeneration rate is geometric.

As

•^The Survey of Management Practices, by Clark L. Wilson (Boulder,
Colorado:
Booth Wright Management Systems, Inc., 1981), and the
Organizational Diagnostic questionnaire. by Robert C. Preziosi [The
1980 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, edited by J. William
Pfeiffer and John E. Jones (San Diego: University Associates, Inc.,
1980) ], both yielded the same results when applied by this student.
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organizations move toward the entropic end of the spectrum,
misalignment increases, degeneration of the organization occurs, and a
state of crisis forms.
It is important to note that "profit," by the model, is not a
predictor of organizational health.

An utility index of zero does not

correlate consistently with zero profit.

A newly formed company at the

early stages of its development may be very healthy and in the ultra
high part of the spectrum and not yet show a profit in its financial
statement.

In contrast, this student has found, along with others,4

that organizations in their declining cycle of development (clearly in
the low band of the spectrum) may show a profit.
Also shown in figure 5, found on page 43, is a general comparison
of utility index spectrum by:

the critical organizational dynamics

that operate; the predominant organizational states; the classical
organizational manifestations that occur as one moves along the
spectrum; and the organizational intervention approach that would be
nost applicable to guide change along the organizational utility
spectrum.

These four areas are placed in relationship to each other

and along the spectrum for ease of comparison and for greater
understanding of the utility spectrum.
The ultra high band or synergistic organizational formation is in
the optimizing or "soaring" organizational state.

Seme typical

organizational manifestations would be a high team spirit, a matrix

4Ichak Adizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," Organizational Dynamics (New
York: American Management Association, Summer 1979), p. 6.
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management type of organizational structure and organizational growth
over one standard deviation above the norm for that particular
industry.

The organizational intervention approach would be ''high-tech

management" (HIM).
The high band part of the utility spectrum or the "rational
organizational formation" is the development, and oftentimes, the
beginning or ending of the degenerating organizational state.

At its

best, the organization in this part of the spectrum has such
manifestations as balance and cooperation, and at the lower end of the
high band the formation of mistrust, conflict, and the beginning of
ccrmmication breakdown or blockage.

The organizational intervention

approach used in both the high and low band portion of the spectrum is
what is cdimonly referred to as Organization Development or O.D.
Disharmonic resonance begins to occur during the low band part of
the spectrum.

Typically characteristics of pre-crisis exist such as

organizational sickness and potentially the formation of organizational
syndromes.

The ultra lew end of the spectrum is depicted by the

destructive degeneration organizational formation brought on by well
established disharmonic resonance.

The organizational state starts as

crisis and, if not turned around, ends in termination for the
organization.

Termination can be in any form from bankruptcy, to an

artificially kept alive private or public organization, to a
restructuring so drastic that the original organization could not be
classified as being the same organization.
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The organization manifestations often observed are paralysis arri
panic to collapse.

The intervention approach to be nest effectively

applied would be Organizational Triage or OIR.

Organizational Triage

is basically a cccplex, three part intervention strategy.

Part one is

the quick assessment, pinpointing, and prioritization of the areas of
misalignment where realignment would provide the greatest change with
the least time and resources expended (find the bleeders).

Part two is

the stabilization phase of the organization which is necessary to
affect the desired realignment process (stop the bleeding).

Part three

is the application of leverage turnaround points to initiate the
realignment of the dominant elements that ultimately provide an
opportunity to reintroduce effective management back into the
organization (apply the treatment).

ni sharmnnic Resonance: A Critical Factor in the
Dynamics of Organizational regeneration
and Crisis Formation
Disharmonic resonance, as used in this theory, is when two or more
elements are in such conflict or dissonance that they set-up an
organization condition that requires the organization to divert
resources from its primary mission to a secondary mission which is to
attempt to resolve the area of conflict.

However, the level of

conflict is so well-established, traditional methods of coping are
ineffective, thus requiring more and more of the organization's
resources and efforts to be diverted.

In other words, disharmonic

resonance is the negative form of organizational synergy.
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A sinple illustration would be when two baseball players fran
opposing teams exchange words.

As the exchanje becomes heated to where

physical confrontation occurs (the state of disharmonio resonance has
been achieved), the "benches enpty."

The game players row focus on

breaking up the fight and protecting their own players.
officials remove the players that started the fitfit.

The game

The resulting

organizational state of the team is less than before the fight, or in
other words, it has degenerated.
Figure 6, entitled "Organizational Utility Spectrum:

Summary of

Dynamics of Degeneration" (see page 49), highlights the key points of
degeneration along the spectrum for further clarification.

As can be

seen, an organization in the high band "G" area meets the conditions
necessary to form a state where misalignment of dominant elements can
start to occur.

As these elements increase in their misalignment, the

next condition is created to set up a disharmonic resonance shown as
"H."

At point "I" disharmonic resonance is formally operating, the

threshold is met where the intolerable level of disorganization occurs,
and performance is most often starting to be severely impacted.

Point

"J" is where the organization has declined to a point where negative
coping mechanisms will be applied proactively in the form of syndromes,
panic, paralysis, and an overall state of crisis exists.

Lastly, point

"K" is the formation of a state where an organization becomes a
candidate for termination.
More specifically, the degeneration cycle is diagrammed in figure
7, labeled "Organizational Degeneration Cycle Example:

A Schematic
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Diagram" (see page 51).

The diagram depicts the evolution of the

degeneration process of an organization through the increasing
misalignment of two or more elements,

in this particular example, the

dominant operational element is motivation feedback with the recipient
of the feedback being the task group and the provider of the feedback
being management.
In this illustration, the perception of the type, level, and
consistency of the motivation feedback being provided starts out being
in sync.

The amount, consistency, form, and other aspects of the

motivation feedback is adequate for the perceived needs of the sender
and receiver.

This in-sync phenomenon is called equilibrium (as

initially developed by Walter Cannon and described best for our
purposes by Kurt Lewin in his treatise "Group Decision and Social
Change")5 as a state of equilibrium has been reached.

This is

expressed in the diagram as a sine wave.
Rcwe and Mason use a metaphor to illustrate this notion of
alignment.
"When two electrical waves 'coincide' in frequency, the
amplitude of the incoming signal will be increased and thus
'anplify' the energy available. Similarly, 'alignment' leads
to increased satisfaction and positive reinforcement, which
in turn contributes to improved performance through greater
psychic energy. The opposite effect can also be predicted:
Lack of alignment tends to lead to negative reinforcement and

5r. Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change," Social Psychology,
eds. E. Maccoby, T. N. Newcanb, and E. L. Hartley (New York:
Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston,

1958).
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decreased performance.
This 'negalignment' inhibits
ocnmitment to the organization or willingness to ccnprtmise
on decisions and ultimately can lead to frustration^
avoidance, and withdrawal.'
When an internal pressure, as shown in figure 7 on page 51, or an
external (environmental)

"driving force" is placed on one or more of

the elements of the organization, the elements succunb and shift to
acccmnodate this influence.

This shift will not always be the same for

each element operating in the organization.

Initially each element

will respond with seme form of resistance—being reactive, passive or
proactive6 7.

This resistance will vary depending on:

the type of

element (dominant or recessive); the element's flexibility (design,
cultural base, and/or role in the organization) ? the intensity and
duration of the pressure? the organizational blockages that exist; the
number of other elements that will be displaced by the element's
adjusting shift to the influence (pressure) ? and the intensity of the
bonding between supportive elements.

The effect of the adjustment due

to the pressure can cause further alignment or misalignment.
7, misalignment was initiated.

In Figure

(Shown as point "A" on figure 7.)

As the misalignment period is extended and increased (shown in the
distance between point "A" and point "B" on figure 7), organizational
dissonance is established (point "B" on figure 7).

Typically this can

be measured as a thirty point spread between respondent groups in the

6Rowe and Mason, Managing with Style:
A Guide to Understanding,
Assessing, and Improving Decision Making, p. 62 - 63.
7Roderick J. Bartell, "Section 117 Assessment," conducted for HRBSinger, Inc., State College, P.A., 18 May 1987, p. 9.
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Survey of

Pr^inm organizational diag**tic !**»»*.

This student's experience has been that when dissc^x* has been fully
developed, other elements within the task cycle ^asurtd by the Survey
glManaqement PnrtW will be loving in the same direction of
misalignment.

Hie exception to this rule is the

»i-fps»9 or ^

pressure element and the "T-TOS-IO or tensicn level element that will
shew up as reactive coping or counter reaction (shown as a positive
score) on this diagnostic instrument.
As the misalignment continues, without corrective intervention,
significant organizational dissonance will be able to be observed and
measured (shown as point "C" on figure 7 found on page 51).

ihe

organization will have digressed to the low range of the organizational
utility spectrum by this time.

Conflict, mistrust, and the start of

caimunication breakdown manifestations, such as rumors largely
replacing timely legitimate communication, will be able to be observed.
11110 Sutvey of Management Practices8 9 10 11 instrument or example element will
measure close to two standard deviations below the norm mean for the
organization.

8Clark L. Wilson, Survey of Management Practices (Boulder,
Colorado: Booth Wright Management Systems, Inc., 1984).
9As defined by the Survey of Management Practices instrument, high
levels of goal pressure, unless accompanied by strong interpersonal
scores, can imply abrasive pressure. Very low scores can denote lack
of push for goal achievement.
10As defined by the Survey of Management of Practices instrument,
the degree of stress in the relations between management and the group
members, feelings of uneasiness in the relationship, etc.
lljWilson, Survey of Management Practices.
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Hie student suggests verifying these measurements with at least
one other instrument, such as the Organizationi
Questionnaire. 12

measuranent of misalignment is presented by a

score of 3.5 or higher for the misaligned element with this instrument.
In cur example, two areas would shew a score of at least 3.5_
"leadership” and "rewards."

The "structure" element would most

probably also shew a movement towards misalignment, but not to the same
level (less than 3.5) on this instrument.
As can be noted on figure 7, found on page 51, the sine waves
between point "B" and "C" are becoming increasingly larger and more out
of sync with each other.

At point "C" the organizational elements are

new in contra-position for the first time.

The intensity is such that

the task group perception of the state of the dominant operational
element, "motivation feedback," is new outside of "accepted limits."
This causes a perturbation of such a level of significance to the
organization that it moves the organization towards an entrcpic
organizational state.

This is shewn as point "D" chi figure 7.

The

organization compensates for this perturbation shown as the trough
following point "D."

This counter reaction is not adequate (point "F")

to form a movement towards a new alignment and in our example the
dissonance is increased once again to a new intensity shewn as point

12Rcbert C.
(ODQ)," The 1980
William Pfeiffer
Inc., 1980), pp.

Preziosi, "Organizational Diagnosis Questionnaire
Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, eds. J.
and John E. Jones (San Diego: University Associates,
112 - 120.
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"G."

It should be noted that in a turnaround cycle,

ciiagram point "G"

would be of lower intensity to that of point "c."
Typically, the pivotal point, shown as point »F,« to avoid further
decline is the ability of management to grasp the severity of the
problem or the misalignment, and management's ability to respond
adequately.

In a degenerative mode, as shown, the management starts to

"freeze up" by denying the severity of the problem, by projecting a
source of blame to another group or situation they do not control, or
by refusing to oamunicate about the problem,

if a solution is

selected, it most often is not radical enough to trigger a turnaround.
For exanple, management may try to implement stronger internal controls
when an extensive management style change is really required.

At this

point of decline, this student often has observed management reart by
increasing internal controls and the use of written corrunications
where in the pash verbal ccinmnicaticns were adequate.
At point "G," shown on figure 7, found on page 51, the condition
is acute and is beccming chronic as the misalignment continues.

The

troughs, shewn as point "E", are moving each time of occurrence further
tewards the cuter limits of "acceptable behavior1' of the organizational
norm.

When the peak of the wave and the trough of each sequential wave

move further with increasing intensity from the "acceptable behavior"
norm for the organization and the dissonance of this element is contra¬
position or alignment, a state of disharmonic resonance is established
(shewn as point "H").

This phenomenon, organizationally speaking, is

the opposite of synergy.

At this point the organizational utility
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index is at zero and continues to decline at a geometric rate of
degeneration.
decreases.

The wave length increases and distance between peaks

This shift from a linear degeneration to a geometric

degeneration requires quicker managerial assessment and more radical
response or adjustment.

From this student's experience, it is these

two managerial skills, assessment and response, that are most often
lacking and help to foster the misalignment condition initially.
At this point in the degeneration process (point "H"), the
organization enters the ultra low band and the organization is now
formally in crisis.

Management paralysis, panic, or other negative

coping behaviors take up the valuable time needed to resolve the
situation.

Organizational syndromes may occur, which often are the

result of one or more internal organization task groups' attenpts at
coping with (counter-reaction) the leadership vacuum that the
managerial crisis state has created.

The task group creates informal,

surrogate leadership that is not recognized, authorized, or in any way
connected to the formal, legitimate power structure of the
organization.

A diagnostic snapshot taken of one of those task groups

at this syndrome development state when this surrogate leadership is in
its early formulation stages would show the diagnostic results register
a much better state (low band profile) than what should really be
depicted.

This false reading occurs because the task group is reacting

to the spurious organizational leadership the surrogate creates.
During this brief period, production will actually increase,
morale will increase, and attrition will stabilize.

However, in a
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short period, the surrogate leadership (often those individuals that
are tost technically proficient or expert and/or tie nest senior)
cannot cepe with the pressure of their dual roles.

They nest perform

in both the expert role required by the fonnal organization am in the
informal leadership role assigned by the task group.

These

individuals, or the "first string" leadership of the task group, then
leave their task group.

This may be in the form of early retirement,

the requesting and acceptance of a special project assignment outside
of the task group, or leaving the organization for another pcsiticn or
for "personal reasons."
As the spurious leadership team or "first string" members start to
leave the task group due to this dual role pressure, increased
leadership is demanded of the remaining leadership team.

The attrition

rate of this "first string" leadership escalates and is replaced by the
"second string1' leadership team.

By the nature of being "second

string," the leaders that replace those that left have less ability to
resist and cope with the dual role pressure.

The result is the task

group leader replacements leave in even shorter time.

The "third

string" leadership, if such a depth of leadership exists, quickly exits
and a new leadership vacuum occurs.

Morale drops, focus is on survival

not production, and resource reserves are quickly depleted.

This state

of degeneration is noted by others outside the task group and the task
group now cannot be trusted to predictably provide value to the
organization.

The stage is set for termination.
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Dgninantai^ Reoftf^s ive Elgpentai_Their

Defini h™

ar]d Pole jji OyganizaUon Degeneration
and Crisis Formal- i rr
Although mentioned already, the organizational element is what
becomes out of alignment and causes the crisis state.

An important

factor in understanding organizations in crisis is to understand and
identify the elements that are out of alignment.
occurrence is the term "dominant element."

The key to this

Organizational elements can

be either dominant or recessive, as proposed by this student.
An element could be:

an individual person such as a manager with

a particular managerial style; a task group that has a defined power
base, such as a collective bargaining group or union; a process such as
task feedback; a specific operating system such as a management
information system or inventory control system; an organizational
condition or state such as a particular mission, structure, culture,
task cycle, state of development, or cycle of development; a group of
relational interface bonding factors:

influence vector/valence, value,

communication pattern, or trust; or an external or internal
environmental condition, such as:

type of technology, rate of

exchange, condition of physical plant, economy, capacity, and
ocnpetiticn.
An element becomes dominant when it meets one or more of the
following four conditions.

One, an assessment of the organizational

condition or managerial profile concludes a specific element or
elements are significantly impacting the efficiency or effectiveness of
other operating elements.

This impacting process can take the form of
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neutralization, triggering, or inhibiting the contribution other
elements provide.

For eaanple, if a manager has a eaasured nental

agility score (reported on the Aj. scale of Ihe Profit b^tament)!!
of 8 or in the 95th percentile for middle managers and a managerial
naivety (lack of ability to probe into issues) score of 2 or low for
managers (Dg scale of The Profiles instrument) the dominant mental
agility element will act to minimize the negative effect of the
managerial naivety (over assuming nature) skill dimension (element).
Another example is when an organizational stressor of lack of task
feedback [measured by the Organizational Role Stress

"resource

inadequacy" (RIn) dimension] measures in the caution range or
inadequate (10 to 15 points), due to insufficient information flow,

it

will typically trigger role ambiguity stress [measured on the
Organizational Role Stress Scale instrument "role ambiguity" (RA)
dimension].

If significantly severe (over 15 points), or if "role

ambiguity" exists over the long-term, the formal organizational
structure becomes in question, and organizational breakdown will
result.
TVro, an element becomes dominant when it varies substantially from
the norm.

Typically an element becomes dominant when it is cx>e or more

standard deviations from the element's norm for the given organization

13James E. Moore, The Profile (Fort Worth, Texas:
International, Inc., 1977).

Profiles

14Udai Pareek, "Organizational Role Stress Scale," The 1983 Annual
for Facilitators. Trainers, and Consultants, eds. Leonard D. Goodstein
and J. William Pfeiffer (San Diego, California: University Associates,
Inc., 1983), pp. 115 - 123.
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or industry.

Par sample, if the role stress mean for all stressors

for an individual manager (measured on the Owanizatim,!

a,-

Ssls) is 96.5 or in the low range and a particular dimension such as
"role overload" [measured by the Organizational tele strre,
instrument "role overload" (RO) dimension] is 18 or in the severe
range, this "role overload" dimension becomes a dominant element.
Ihree, an element also becomes dominant when it acts independently
to "drive" or to influence a major shift in the interactions between
other elements.

For exanple, market for a product has been shown to be

a strong organizational variable and would, therefore, by definitial,
be a dominant element.

Four, an element that requires an unusual

amount of attention or resources to maintain would also be dominant.
An exanple of this is when an employee has personal problems that
affect his work and require special counseling and management
attention.
As an organization develops, the dominance or recessiveness of an
element may change or even switch.

The author has not found any type

of intervention approach to be successful in arbitrarily changing the
dominance or recessiveness of a given element short of changing the
whole complexion of the organization which Miles, in his book The
Organizational Life Cycle.15 argues may not in reality be the same
organization.

15Jchn R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The
Organizational T.ife Cycle (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass
Inc., Publishers, 1981).
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It should be noted that the presence of dominant elaents does not
surest misalignment exists or will develop.

However, this student has

noted that the existence of a large meter of dcmnmnt eluents creates
a very ocmplex organizational state that mates intervention or reversal
of organizational decline mdi more difficult to accomplish and
requires a mxh longer -healing- time for the organization to reach a
new state of equilibrium.
In studying hundreds of organizations, this student has been able
to identify a number of such elements that are candidates for
misalignment.

There are twelve primary organizational element areas.

As the reader will note, not all elements are exclusive to a primary
organizational element area, but they do overlap in that often one or
more will be operating sunUtanecusly in two or more primary
organizational element areas.

They are:

1) .

Organizational Rirpose

2) .

Organizational Configuration

3) .

Motivation

4) .

leadership Relations

5) .

Task Readiness/Ability

6) .

Supporting Systems and Structures

7) .

Task Group Relations

8) .

Technical Environment (internal)

9) .

Economic Environment (external)

10).

Fhysical Environment
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11) .

Organizational Flexibility

12) .

Manager/Organization Profile Interface

These primary element areas mist be in alignment with one another as
well as the elements within each of the primary element areas.

These

internal element alignments are discussed in more detail as follows.
Element Area:

Organizational Ptrrpreo

The first element area—organizational purpose—typically is seen
operationally as the elements of vision statements, mission statements,
goals (both personal and organizational wide), objectives, and task
purpose or clarity.

In other words, why was the organization formed

and what business are we in?

As the organization becomes more mature,

the personal goals and objectives must be realigned with the
organizational goals as less variance can be tolerated.

This is

diagrammed in figure 8, found on page 63.
Also seen on this diagram is an example, shown as "B" and "C," of
a typical misalignment.

The individual is advancing or maturing

organizationally at a faster rate than is his/her organization as an
entity.

This student has been able to identify six stages of

maturation through which organizations evolve.

The stages are:

Stage

I—autocratic (often founder operated) ? Stage II—benevolent (typically
a "family*' orientation) ? Stage III—formal pyramidal (traditional boss
and employee role orientation); Stage IV—participative (structured
task teams with team leaders); Stage V—emergent (shared leadership
which often includes employee ownership, matrix management, or
"professional team" orientation); and Stage VI—holistic (where one's

Stage of
Organizational
—Maturation

Stage VI

Stage V

Stage IV

•

Stage III

Stage II

►

Stage I

Organizational
Goals/Objectives

Individual
Goals/Obj ectives

* Amount of alignment between individual and organization goals/
objectives by stage of organizational maturation.
(A)

- Before individual or organization can move to next higher
stage of organizational maturity, each individual and the
organization has to sacrifice or give something up.
The void
created is filled by the relationship with the organization.
(B) (C) - Example of a misalignment between individual and organization.
FIGURE 8
ALIGNMENT:

PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
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vocation and advocation meet and where labor and management
organizational lines are dissolved).

As goals and objectives become

more clearly understood and in concert between the organizational
maturation level and the individual, alignment is nore

likely and the

opportunity for a state of synergy to exist is increased.
Element Area:_Organizational Configuration
This element area has often been labeled "organizational
structure."

However, the student has enlarged this element classifi¬

cation to enccnpass the dynamics of the elements of organizational
growth, development, culture, and operational mode.

The variables or

elements that make up these dynamics include the following:
-

history;

-

size;

-

age;

-

mission;

-

stage of development, as adapted from Jack Gibb16 and further
developed by Roderick Bartell17, which includes six stages:
Stage I—autocratic; Stage II—benevolent; Stage III—formal
pyramidal; Stage IV—participative; Stage V—emergent; and
Stage VI—holistic;

16Jack R. Gibb, "Iirproving Organizational Effectiveness through
Focus on Environmental Qiality," The Cutting Edge, ed. W. Warner Burke
(San Diego, California:
University Associates, Inc., 1978), pp. 120 131.
17Roderick J. Barbell, "Small Ccranunity Development Stages," paper
presented to the Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs, State
College, Pennsylvania,

1983.

(Typewritten.)
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cycle of development, as developed by Ichak Adizes, which
includes ten cycles:

courtship; infancy; go-go;

prune; maturity; aristocracy; early bureaucracy;

adolescence;
bureaucracy;

and death.18
-

phase of development, as developed by Wilson Learning, which
include:

I-fomative; II-normtive; and Ill-integrative. «

-

task cycle;

-

values;

-

operating environment;

-

table of organization/structure.

Again, these elements must act in harmony or be in alignment for
synergy to be maximized.

Organizational structure is a major element

that must be selected to meet the needs of the organization.

This area

has been part of the organizational behavior literature from its early
beginnings and still is of central inportance to many organizational
theorists.

Keith D. Wilcock in his book The Corporate Triber20 r takes

the reader from early tribes to modem day corporat ional structures and
makes a point that all have a carmen link—they all have structure.

He

18Adizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," p. 25.
19Wilson Learning Corporation, Leadership Management Seminar (Eden
Prairie, Minnesota; Wilson Learning Corporation, 1984), p. 8.
20Keith D. Wilcock, The Corporate Tribe (Excelsior, Minnesota:
The Wyer Pearce Press, 1984), pp. 36 - 42.
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further suggests that the basic building block of human organizations
is the pyramid, regardless of its configuration.21
Many organizational concepts evolve out of structure and design,
such as chain^f-ccranand, span of control, informal and formal
structure, centralization and decentralization, specialization, unity
of cannand, and matrix form.22

This author has observed that the more

complex the organization and the lower the stage of development, the
more preoccupied (dominant element) the organization is with structure.
In addition, the younger the cycle, the less concern is expressed for
formal structure and the less organizational complexity exists,

in

other words, the structural design must be aligned to intersect along
both the horizontal "stage" axis (Gibb,23 and Bartell24) and the
vertical "cycle" axis (Adizes25).
The organizational structure or design must also be sensitive to
the existing internal organizational environment and the operating
medium or external environment in which the organization must survive.
Therefore, structural alignment is a sensitive and complex matter that
must be carefully studied before change is made, otherwise the

21Ibid., p. 40.
22Don Hellriegal, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Richard W. Woodman,
Orqansaticnal Behavior (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company,
1983), pp. 310 - 346.
23Gibb, "Inproving Organizational Effectiveness through Focus on
Environmental Quality," pp. 120 - 131.
24Roderick J. Bartell, "Small Community Development Stages."
2^Mizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating
Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," p. 25.
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prescribed treats my only act to speed the degeneration process.
For the organizational triage (COS) practitioner, the use of tradition
or temporary organizational structural designs is nost helpful.
Par example, the organization in crisis is best aligned by using
the "cluster" management structure until a temporary stability or
quasi-stationary level of equilibrium can be established.

Once

Stability is established and alignment is achieved, the various
departmental units can be reintroduced to other npre conventional
structural forms.
For another example, if the management operates in a Stage Iautocratic, over directing mode—and their employee task group has
matured to a Stage V—professional team orientation—with little need
for uni-directional leadership, an element misalignment exists,

if no

adjustment is made, mistrust, conflict, breakdown in oomunications,
and ultimately negative coping mechanisms will occur.

The intervention

point clearly then is one of aligning the stage of development instead
of sane other element, such as changing the size of the work group or
increasing the goal pressure which is most often attempted.
Element Area:

Motivation

Althcugh often entitled "rewards" in survey instruments, again,
this student has enlarged the meaning.

This element includes the need

for alignment of such skill factors or elements as managerial profile/
task unit alignment, often over-siirplified as "leadership"? need
hierarchy; expected results; time/urgency or task internalization; task
type and skill level achieved; work setting; fear? organizational
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tolerance; role stress; level of aspiration; rewards; imediacy,
clarity, and method of feedback; jcto configuration (piece work,
professional, creative, etc.); personal situation at any given point in
time; and competing areas of attention (rndti^ectors).
logically upact motivation.

These factors

Alignment of an organizational rentier

with these factors is critical.

In most cases, all or rest are

interacting elements that provide motivation.
Element Area:

Leadership Relations

This element area is the interfacing of the manager with his/her
woric team.

Collectively in seme organizations it becomes management-

labor relations.

Having been involved in negotiations and arbitration

for twenty years, this student coined the phrase leadership relations
as a more descriptive term as it suggests a greater, multi-faceted
level of complexity that must exist for proper alignment to occur.

The

elements include:
-

skill and knowledge;

-

managerial profile (not just style) interface with employees,
peers and superiors;

-

written standards;

-

goal interpretation motivated by personal values;

-

power base (formal; informal; intensity—note:

this includes

coercive, legitimate, expert, referent, reward, information,
connection/linkage, withholding, and enabling power usage);
-

power motive (personalized; socialized; affiliative) and power
style;
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-

influence vector/valence;
profile of people must interact with;

-

task;

-

time constraints;

~

interpersonal skills.

It shculd be noted that an influence vector/valence is the amount
of influence an individual can bring to an organizational role by the
force of one's personality exhibited as a behavior.

This force is the

number generated from the Interoersonal Check r.ist rorr.) instroment.26
the number is the intensity of the sum of the personality traits
that can have either a positive or negative valence.

A positive

valence is a "warro" or gregarious influence style and a negative
valence is a "cool" or detached influence style.

The valence is not to

be confused with a "positive mental attitude" which is not addressed by
the influence vector or valence.
Ihe stronger the vector the more influence the person brings to
the organization.

The influence vector/valence can be sunned for a

task group or team to determine the formation and potential influence
of organizational "power pockets."

To bring about change in an

organization in crisis a state of temporary steady state must be
established which can occur by equalizing the negative and positive
vectors (the sum equals or nearly equals zero) which will allow an

26Rolfe LaForge and Robert F. Suczek, "Interpersonal Check List
(ICL)," The 1977 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, eds. John E.
Jones and J. William Pfeiffer (San Diego, California; University
Associates, Inc., 1977), pp. 91 - 96.
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external intervention team to establish the necessary influence to
create the needed changes.
This student has often found this element area to be fertile
ground on which to initiate an assessment as to the source of major
mistrust and conflict in organizations that are in decline or crisis.
Element Area:

Task ReadinPas/AHii ii-y

This student focuses on job—employee and job—task group
alignment.

The elements that most often become misaligned arc:

-

personality of employee;

-

aptitude to perform task (such as mechanical aptitude) through
proper selection processes;

-

experience;

-

education;

-

training;

-

orientation to the job/task;

-

motor skills and strength;

-

mental agility;

-

selection.

A large amount of organization development effort is expended in
developing this element area, although the "shotgun" approach towards
training and development is not an efficient method to obtain
alignment.

Only through precise and individualized assessments can the

alignment objective be isolated and "targeted" with development
efforts.

Most often if the skill dimension element is cut of alignment

and is also a d-W skill element,

of
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useful for realigns as develqpinj a new skill or jcfc ability.
Element Apeaj—Supporting Systems and Structure
Biis element area relates to what are often called •'helpful
inec^anisns'' that act to facilitate the operations of an organization.
Although there are numerous elements that fall into this area, the
primary ones that most often seem to operate are the following:
-

Administrative/Support Structure;

-

Control Systems;
Reward Systems (Reinforcement of Good Performance);
Oamunicaticiy^

Feedback Systems;

Fewer Structure;
-

Motivation Systems;

-

Decision Efficiency/Style;

-

Labor Organizations/Associations ;

-

Operating Syndromes.

Element Area:

Task Group Relations

Group relations include a host of elements that interact to form
the substance of task groups.

The elements or factors that most often

reflect the potential ability for groups to relate include;
-

Size of Group;

-

Influence Vector/Valence;

-

Age of Group;

-

Goals and Objectives;
Goal Pressure;
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-

Relationships ?

-

Leader Profile;

-

Task Type and Clarity;

-

Ochesiveness/Bcnding;

-

Purpose of Group;

—

Formal/ Informal Groupings;

-

Task Agreement;

-

Values;

-

Political Dynamics;

-

Trust Level;

-

Communication Patterns and Synapse Efficiency.

Element Area:

Technical Environment (internal)

The internal technical environment consists of the alignment of
the following predominant elements:
-

Condition of Plant;

-

Condition and Type of Equipment;

-

Type of Technology (Service/Product);

-

Raw materials Need and Availability;

-

Rate of Exchange;

-

Technology Development Curve.

Element Area:

Economic Environment (External)

The external economic environment often creates pressure on
internal elements.

The external element points that most often impact

the internal elements and become misaligned include the following:
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Capacity;
Resources (Short-TerVLong-lterTn);
-

Competition;

~

Economy;

-

Operating Ratios;

-

Market/demand.

Element Area:

Physical Envirirynmpnt-

Ihe physical elements that most often are impacted and become
misaligned include, frcm experience;
-

Location;

-

Amenities of Position;

-

Shifts;

-

Safety;

-

Job Lay-out;

-

Noise;

-

Image.

Element Area:

Organizational Flexibility

Organizational flexibility, or the ability of an organization to
read internal and external pressures and make the appropriate
adjustments, is probably the greatest factor in whether an organization
becomes misaligned or not.

The key elements or factors identified to

be operating in the study of numerous organizations by this student
include the following;
-

Task/Product/Servioe;

-

Feedback Systems;
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-

Environment Monitoring Systems;

-

Organizational Monitoring Systems;

-

Culture;

-

Stage of Development;

-

Cycle of Development;

-

Riase of Development;

-

Econcmic/Fiscal Structure;

-

Managerial Profile;

-

Stress Coping Mechanisms;

-

History;

-

Age.

Element Area:

Manaoer/Oraanization Profile Interface

Having assessed hundreds of managers in their organizational
context, this student has concluded that the interface between the
operating manager's profile and the fit of this profile with the
desired profile to create a synergistic organizational state is
probably the most sensitive of element areas.

It is also one of the

most precise areas in which to intervene to turn around an organization
through alignment.

Although this student has been able to measure well

over ninety managerial skill elements, the following list most often
forms the core of the dominant acting elements.
-

style of leadership;

-

Style of Management;

-

Change Agent Style;

-

Communication Style/Pattem;

-

Decision Style;

-

Empowerment Style?

-

Intervention Style?

-

Influence Style?

-

Conflict Management Style;

-

Influence Vector/Valence;

-

Nervous/Dynamic Tension;

-

Mental Agility;

-

Dominance;

-

Work Motivation Pattern;

-

Work Style Preference?

-

Managerial/Organizational Fhilosophy;

-

Time Management;

-

Role Stress;

“

Leadership Flexibility and Effectiveness?

-

Dominant Driving Personality Traits;

-

Work Habits (Organization/Planning) ?

-

Sociability;

-

Emotional Maturity?

-

Stress Profile?

-

Stress Coping Mechanisms/Approach;

-

Stamina?

-

Naivete.

Ichak Adizes, in his book Hew to Solve the Mismanagement Crisis
spent considerable time discussing how the management style must
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interface with the cycle of develcpnent of the organization

He makes

a strong case for the need for a management style to be adjusted at
each of nine different cycle charges an organization ray experienced
He suggested that a management team has four basic roles that must used
in proper proportions or-by our term-be in alignment.

These roles

were production, administration, entrepreneurial, and integration
Depending on the cycle of development, a certain centoination
was required to be dominant and others to be recessive or not desired
to be present at all.

For example, a strong divergent managerial style

diagrammed as PAel is dysfunctional to organizations in their
"infancy," "go-go," and "adolescent" stages28.

However, such a style

would be in alignment for organizations that are in a "mature" stage of
development.
Jack Gibb, in his ten stages of organizational development, also
recognized the need to shift managerial styles.

In fact, he suggested

the lack of shift in style could impede an organization from moving to
a higher stage of organizational development.29

He further stated that

a most critical time to an organization occurs when there is a shift
from one stage to another stage.

During this period, leadership is

27Ichak Mizes, Hcm to Solve the Mismanagement Crisis (Santa
Monica: Mizes Institute, Inc., 1979), pp. 13 - 92.
28Ichak Mizes, "Organizational Passages—Diagnosing and Treating
Lifecyle Problems of Organizations", p. 25.
29Jack R. Gibb, "Improving Organizational Effectiveness through
Focus on Erwironmerrtal Quality," pp. 120 - 131.
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roost necessary and the failure to adjust

one's managerial philosophy/

style would inhibit the prooessSO.

This author has also been able to identify six stages of
organizational evoluticn as already discussed.

Alignment of managerial

Style to stage of development has proven to be a very important factor
m developing a healthy local government work environment; healthy
being defined as cost effective servioe provided by a work unit that
has high morale and a belcw average level of labor grievances,
attrition, and citizen complaints.
Often as an organization declines, the number of elements out of
alignment will increase along with the intensity of the misalignment.
Ihe efficiency of the intervention process, or the ability to sort out
or prioritize which dominant elements need to be adjusted, must
increase proportionately with the extent to which the organizational
decline has occurred if the turnaround effort is to be successful.

Inhibitors to Normal Organizational Development
Change is the golden thread that weaves through the fabric of
normal organization development.

An organization can continue to

develop and grew only as long as its capacity for change is not
impeded.

Once a triggering event occurs that interrupts an

organization's normal course, a series of change phases must be worked
through in order for the organization to reach a new condition of
equilibrium.

30Ibid.

In other words, an organizational climate must be
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established and maintained that gives an organization the ability to
adapt to changing conditions.

As stated before, premature exiting or

not completing any one of these phases causes the equilibrium state to
be less than fully realized.
Hie types of equilibrium process malfunctioning experienced, and
therefore labeled by this student, that act to inhibit the completion
of the movement through the phases include:
-

"Arrest" or an inability to proceed from one state to
another31;

-

"Short cycling" or an inability to complete a particular phase,
and the process of the stage continues to recycle with a
greater intensity at each cycle.

Defensive patterns may

persist and actually begin to dominate the organizational
function completely (often expressed as a syndrome);
-

"Premature exiting" when the process is prematurely completed
and where all of the organizational elements inpacted have not
yet mutually reached the required threshold to move to the next
phase;

-

"Regression" or the process of moving backward to a previous
phase (this often occurs to compensate for a premature
exiting);

-

"Fixation" may occur when the organization is so traumatized by
the change event as to not allow the available coping

31Manfred F. R. Rets de Vries and Danny Miller, The Neurotic
Organization (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers,
1985), p. 163.
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mechanisms to become activated (not unlike a car trying to
shift gears at a high rpm without the use of a clutch) ;
"raise phase” may occur when the movement does not go to a
legitimate next phase, tut creates another alternative phase
that does not lead the organization to a constructive
equilibrium.
Given these types of process malfunctioning exist, a series of
questions naturally evolve:
malfunction?
change?

What causes a particular type of

What makes an organization not fully recover from a

What causes an organization not to reach the former level of

equilibrium or achieve an even greater level of balance in one's
environment?

What causes an organization not to be able to "refreeze"

or allow the change to "take" (integrate the change into current
operations) ?
Fran the author's observations and buttressed by the literature
(Baker, 197332; and Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, 198033) one finds
that an organization that continually fails to reach the fully
developed equilibrium state starts to degenerate or decline.

Once this

situation is initiated, further negative stimuli or the crisis state
experienced by the organization becomes more and more difficult to cope
with and the process recycles with increasingly devastating results.

32Everett E. Hagen, "Analytical Models in the Study of Social
Systems," Organizational Systems; General Systems Approaches to
Carolex Organizations, ed. Frank Baker (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irvin, Inc., 1973), p. 78.
33Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle,
pp. 165 - 171.
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This phenomenon, already labeled by this author as "disharmonic
resonance," acts to plunge the organization into a further crisis
state.

This increasing crisis state triggers "inhibitors" that act to

exacerbate the malfunctioning of the equilibrium development process
and increase the organizational element misalignment.

The primary

classes of inhibitors that have been observed by the author in numerous
consulting efforts are:

defensive patterns and defense mechanisms;

traumatized leadership? organizational blockages; and organizational
syndromes.
It is important to note that one or more of these inhibitors may
be functioning at any given time? the various members, units or
elements of an organization may be at one or more of the equilibrium
generation phases; and the "regression" type of malfunction tends to
operate in organizations under stress (Brenner, 1976; Nemiah, 1978).34
Regression, as herein used, is ". . .a desire to revert back to a
mode(s) of adaptation and behavior more appropriate to an earlier stage
of development."35

In reality, it is a form of remembering and

reenacting past behaviors that are new no longer applicable to the
current state of development of the organization.

Entrcpic Defensive Patterns or Defense Mechanisms
Typically, defensive patterns or defense mechanisms are called
upon as a temporary coping organizational behavior that can act to

34Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 229.
35Ibid., pp. 137 - 138.
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reestablish a new condition for equilibrium.

However, from

considerable observation of organizations moving into a pre-crisis or
cxisis state, the defensive patterns or defense mechanisms take on a
different dimension.

The literature also suggests such a phenomenon

may exist as expressed by Mmro, 1974,36 and Kets de Vries and Miller,
1984.37

under such pre-crisis or crisis conditions, the defensive

patterns seem to persist and even begin to dominate organizational
functions completely and act to inhibit attempts to achieve a new state
of homeostasis.
Sucii defensive patterns or defense mechanisms act not unlike an
over-abundance of white cells in the body that attack the red cells of
the body.

Normally the white cells are constructive, but can become

destructive under certain conditions; so it seems with defensive
patterns and defense mechanisms that are triggered when an individual
or organization experiences acute anxiety.

The overuse and/or

inappropriate usage of such defensive patterns or defense mechanisms
seem to be at the core of the problem.

(Often managers use defensive

mechanisms as an all-purpose management tool when other pro-active
tools and strategies would better address the situation.)
As Kets de Vries and Miller write:
"We should keep in mind, however, that all these
arrests (defense mechanisms included) in the working
through process may occur in the transformation toward
successful change. What distinguishes their

36Jim L. Munro, Administrative Behavior and Police Organization,
(Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Ccnpany, 1974), p. 128.
37Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, pp. 22 - 42.
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dysfunctional nature is sinply their tenacity and

Ihe primary defensive mechanisms that have been most frequently
observed by this author in his work with organizations in the pre¬
crisis or crisis state include the following.
Denial is the most observed defense mechanism.

Executives; boards

of directors; and, to a lesser extent, lower line and staff personnel
will deny the reality of the situation or state of affairs and cling to
the past.39

This behavior continues the degeneration of the situation.

When taken to the extreme and the situation continues to degenerate,
there is a perceived and/or real withdrawal of status or respect which
may lead to manic behavior; which may be very aggressive and
destructive to the organization.40

This author has experienced such

acts in extreme cases to be appropriately labeled sabotage of the
organization.
Displacement is another defensive maneuver.

In this maneuver

affected organizational parts or units redirect their anger away from
the responsible party and toward someone or something else such as a
person, institution, object, unit, or department.41

This displaced

blame can fool even the experienced organizational diagnostician in
that even though the source of the problem is actually wrongly

38Ibid., p. 165.
39Ibid., p. 141.
40Ibid., p. 142.
41Ibid., pp. 163 - 164.
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identified, there will be an agreement in responses obtained using
traditional data sailing techniques.

This consensus may then lead to

a "false positive" and solutions are built on a wrong prause.
cognitive disconnection sets up a third and fourth type of defense
pattern of repressing and splitting.

Cognitive disconnection occurs

when "... the emotional responses are uncoupled from the situation

that elicited them . . ."42

m impression, unacceptable perceptions,

ideas, and impulses are removed from direct awareness.«

For example,

an executive keeps forgetting to write a memo about a negative
organizational condition, tut keeps premising to write the memo.
Splitting is found to exist in a most observable fashion in public
sector organizations from this author's experience.
creates two groups - "we” and "they.”
toward the latter group.44

Splitting often

The hostile energy is directed

When splitting is taken to the extreme, a

paranoid view of the world exists and one must be prepared for attack
and be able to handle the "worst case" situation.
The fifth defense mechanism is where the individuals or groups
will themselves assume the "scapegoat" role.

With this defense

mechanism, the troubled individuals or groups personally assmw> the
responsibility for the blame instead of looking for other sources of
blame.

This process may result in consistent reproaching for minor

42Ibid., p. 164.
43Ibid.
44Ibid.
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events, a tendency towards accident proneness, extreme learned
helplessness, and passivity.45
Another defense mechanism is called the "Lone Ranger Syndrome.»46
This behavior acts to signal to those involved that an individual or
group does not need help and no one else is needed.

Inplied with this

defense mechanism is that no one can do the job right so the executive
will do it himself/herself.

This defense mechanism also can be seen as

a cover-up for one's overreaction to a feeling of helplessness, and
therefore takes on the air of independence.
Other more common defense mechanisms observed include projection,
transference, conversion, rationalization, reaction formation or overoarpensation, displacement, sublimation, and passive-aggressive
behavior.47

The first six defense mechanisms defined above cue

organizational defensive patterns that are more easily observable in a
group setting.

The last nine (projection, transference, etc.) are more

often observed in individual employees and could be classified as
individual defense mechanisms.
Several of these defenses have been observed operating
simultaneously in very troubled organizations.

The factor of multiple

operating defenses makes diagnosing the source of actual organizational
problem(s) often difficult.

When these defensive patterns and defense

45Ibid.
46Ibid.
47Munro, Administrative Behavior and Police Organization, pp. 128
- 129.
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■"echani^ are taken to the e*tre»e e»er a tag period of tire, they
beccre entrepic or act to create a conditta

-here

a state of

equilibrium is not easy to achieve and further degenerate or declire

occxxrs at a geometric rate.
It is interesting to note that through careful historical tracing
of a chief executive officer's defense mechanisms,

one

can see a

"downshifting" fran a more acceptable to a less acceptable defense
mechanism as his/her organization continues to deteriorate.

This can

often be used as a clue to help establish the rate and period of tire
the organization has been declining.

Traumatized leadership
The managerial skills needed for turnaround and the realignment of
the elements are too often lacking and the termination occurs.

The

first major managerial requirement is to be able to be sensitive to the
movement of dominant elements into misalignment.

If an organization

does not have adequate trust between its members to allow for the free
flew of cxxnmjnicaticn and feedback, management is already at a
disadvantage.

If management does not constantly monitor the evaluation

of the organization and adapt the policies, procedures, behaviors,
support systems, structure, style, and climate, to name a few dominant
elements, misalignment will occur and will be allowed to develop long
before detection can be made.

This student has observed that there

seems to be a rather strong correlation between the insensitivity of
managers and their inability to act predictably or respond in an
adequate fashion to reverse misalignment.
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As figure 9 on page 87 illustrates, the misalignment continues
whether detected or not.

As more time passes, the severity of the

misalignment is greater.

Not being sensitive allows the misalignment

to develop in severity, and therefore requires a greater level of
managerial skills to reverse this condition.

As shown, if the manager

does not detect the misalignment, incorrectly diagnoses the source and
elements cut of alignment, improperly develops a strategy of
intervention, hesitates to implement a chosen strategy (even if
correct), or inadequately applies the intervention strategy, time still
continues.

In other words, the organization continues to degenerate

independently of anything but the proper (type and amount) application
of intervention protocol.
The second major managerial requirement is to have the managerial
skills, traits, and abilities known as a managerial profile.

Although

this student has been able to classify managerial profiles into
nineteen general groups, figure 9 further collapses these nineteen
groups into four major profile categories.
categories are:

These four major profile

maintenance manager profile, development manager

profile, change-agent manager profile, and crisis manager profile.
When placed on a continuum, as shown on figure 9, from maintenance
manager to crisis manager, the managerial skill level becomes clear.
The maintenance manager is conventional in his/her knowledge and
skill level of management and organizational operations.
managers fall within this profile category.

A majority of

This is probably due to

nagers with Required
to Address Alignment
Profile)

Time

FIGURE 9
REQUIRED MANAGERIAL FHDFIIE AND AVAILABILITY OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH MANAGERIAL PROFILES NEEDED
TO REVERSE ORGANIZATIONAL DEGENERATION
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the notion that a majority of managerial learning cones firm role
modeling and most role models fall within this category.
The second category or development manager profile has a higher
level of maturity as a manager.

This type of manager has a well

developed desire and the skills to develop his/her organization and its
members.

Fewer managers fall within this category, but still a

reasonable number exist within this category.

Having been involved

with the selection of executives for many years, it has been this
student's experience that, as an average, between ten and fifteen out
of fifty applicants fit this profile.
The third category is the change-agent.

Even fewer of these type

individuals are found in this student's work with several thousand
managers.

If five in fifty applicants have this profile it is

considered a bit unusual.

This category contains managers that have

highly specialized and refined skills in organization change and
transformation.

These individuals are truly masters of their craft and

possess a good knowledge base.
The fourth category, the crisis manager or managerial heros, are
rarely seen in organizations.

There are four reasons.

One, most

managers have never worked under a crisis manager long enough to obtain
the skills.

Two, most organizations do not operate regularly in the

crisis mode, and therefore there is little opportunity to practice
these skills and little need to use these skills.

Three, the typical

crisis manager profile is such that they need a crisis to feel
comfortable, needed, and successful as a manager.

To keep a crisis
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manager employed in an organization not in crisis tends to cause
conflict.

The crisis manager may, on occasion, allow misalignments to

intentionally develop so they, as managers, can once again have value
to the organization.

If they do not set up crisis situations, they

still attack an organization or managerial problem from their crisis
managerial perspective which results in over-ocnpensaticn and a new
misalignment.

Fourth, it is not natural for people to like crisis and

the stress it often generates.

People tend to want to avoid

confrontation, risk taking, making radical changes based on limited
data, and taking the point position in implementing radical changes.
Therefore, this student sees fewer than one crisis manager for every
two hundred managers.

The result of this lew number of crisis managers

available suggests that the formulation of crisis management teams
external to established organizations is a logical alternative.
When one looks at figure 9, found on page 87, it becomes clear
that as the lag in time increases from misalignment occurrence to the
point of intervention, the skill level required is greatly increased,
but the probability that the needed skill or managerial profile will be
available is greatly decreased.
Traumatized leadership is then defined as when an individual or
group of individuals is placed in a leadership position and is not
experienced in dealing with the stress that occurs from a
malfunctioning change process or an organization that is resisting a
needed change for survival (required coping).
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Each manager has his/her own managerial profile that is made up of
several managerial, personal, and technical skill dimensions.

Each of

these dimensions varies from individual to individual as to the level
of development achieved.

The ability to managerially and personally

cepe with stress, crisis, and change then depends on the individual's
profile or the level of maturity, the operating range within each
dimension, and the flexibility to operate within this range.

The more

developed the dimension, the greater the operating range and the ease
by which one moves from one style to another style along a given
dimension, the greater the probability of the manager to be able to
effectively cepe with organizational, operational, and environmental
stress causing events.
The greater the level of stress and crisis conditions in an
organization, the closer the manager should be to having a "crisis
manager*' profile which is significantly different than the more
traditional "maintenance manager" profile.

The maintenance manager

placed in a crisis organizational climate can easily become traumatized
which acts not unlike "managerial paralysis" as the individual seems to
"freeze up" under such conditions.

When this "freeze up" occurs, the

manager/leader often becomes inflexible; selects a defense mechanism
and becomes preoccupied with its use? oily uses a "lew risk" management
style that does not proactively address the problem areas; and often
spends exceptional energy in documenting and retaining the documenta¬
tion of every action taken via memos, letters, taping meetings, etc.,
in order to offer "proof" in defense of his/her actions.
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Organizational RlorJovy^
As Kufcerly, et. al (1980) wrote as to the cause of organizational
calamities, "Corporate calamities are caused by calamities created by
people,"48 so is the source of organizational blockages.

Woodcock ard

Francis (1975) wrote with regard to organizational prcblens, "All of
the problems and difficulties we have described are, basically, people
problems, which can be seen as organizational blockages that rW-r-^c^
the efficiency of the system as a whole."49

For interested readers,

the book Unblocking Your Organization by Woodcock and Francis is
recommended.
Although the blockages identified by Woodcock and Francis are
quite useful for client explanation purposes, it should be noted, from
the organizational diagnostic perspective, they do not explain how they
evolve or the cause-effect relationship the blockage has on the
organization's ability to achieve a condition of equilibrium and the
ultimate change required.

From this writer's study of complex

organizations in the various stages of pre-crisis and crisis, he would
suggest further research into organizational blockages—their
development and impact.

Such research may provide substantial

information towards the study and diagnostics of organizational decline
and/or failure.

48Kimberly, Miles, and Associates, The Organizational Life Cycle,
pp. 360 - 361.
49Mike Woodcock and Dave Francis, Unblocking Your Organization
(San Diego, California: University Associates, Inc., 1975), pp. 25 - 34
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The results of a rather simple research effort conducted by this
student along with several different consulting tasks helps support
this statement.

By using an organizational diagnostic method called

ECOO analysis (episodic ccnmmication channels in organization) the
blockage of "inadequate control" and, in particular, the ccrammications
aspect of this blockage was studied.
Nine organizations were analyzed that were similar in size and
services provided.

In the nine organizational cases studied, seven

were classified as being in crisis (as generally agreed by the
employees, managers, and Boards of Directors) and two were judged as
not being in crisis, although not without organizational problems.

All

seven "in crisis" organizations showed a channel blockage at one or
more critical points, primarily between top executive management and
the board of directors and/or chief executive officer or between top
executive management and top level line management.

This consultant

labeled this observed channel blockage phenomenon as "synapse
breakdown."
In other words, the organizational individuals were operating not
unlike the region of contact between two or more nerve cells across
which an impulse is sent, but that is not getting a good connection and
incomplete signals are received.

It was further interesting to note

that the "synapse breakdown" occurred when there was a conflicting
style of management exhibited between the "effector" and the "receptor"
and there was a significant difference between vector (influence)
intensity and/or significant similarity of the valence of the vector.
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An additional observation was made that in all seven "crisis”
cases, a DVAL (Deviation Anplifying loop) Syndrome was well into the
development stages or definitely existed, and in the most critical
cases two or more syndromes were almost fully developed or were fully
developed.

Hie SER (Subcptimum Entropy Reduction) Syndrome was the

second most often observed syndrome to be identified.
In the two "non-crisis" cases, no "synapse breakdown" was observed
and control was considered in the normal zone according to the
instruments used, which were the Survey of Mananpn^nt Prartif^50
(Clark, 1982) and by the Woodcock and Francis Blockage Diagnostic
Questionnaire (1979).51

Hie Styles of leadership gn™oy52 ^ ^

Styles of Management Inventory53 were in general agreement and the
influence vectors were either low and/or of opposite polarity in terms
of valence.
Similar field studies have been conducted in other blockage areas
by this writer which have furthered his diagnostic ability and general
understanding of the dynamics of organizational intra-actions of key
elements.

Blockage research could be a very fertile ground for the

organizational development and behavior researcher.

50Clark L. Wilson, Survey of Management Practices.
51Woodcock and Francis, Unblocking Your Organization, pp. 25 - 34.
52Jay Hall and Martha S. Williams, Styles of tAirship Survey
(Hie Woodlands, Texas: Telecmetrics International, 1986).
53Jay Hall, Jerry B. Harvey, and Martha S. Williams, Styles of
Management Inventory (Hie Woodlands, Texas: Telecmetrics
International, 1986).
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Organizational SvrriTrrre
Currently, the use of the term and identification of organiza¬
tional syndromes is at best a descriptive term used by some
organizational researchers and consultants.

Normally the term is used

in the same general way as used in the medical profession.

A syndrome

in the medical context is a pattern of symptoms that exist within a
disease.

In an organization context, a syndrome is a "group of

observable signs and/or synptans that occur together and characterize a
particular abnormality."54

Rets de Vries and Miller write:

».

troubled firms whose symptoms and dysfunctions ccntoine to form an
integrated 'syndrome' of pathology."55
This author, unfamiliar with the use of the term by other
organizational consultants, noted ccnmon sets of organizational
behaviors that existed between a large number of police departments
with which he consulted over a course of seme twelve years.

Therefore,

in 1982, the author began the process of collating, classifying, and
labeling recurrent behaviors that as a group would act as symptene of a
particular chronic organizational problem.

Later, while researching

for this dissertation, the author found the term was being used by
others.
Stanley Sherman, president of University Center, a consulting firm
in Waltham, Massachusetts, identified an organizational phenomenon

54Roderick J. Barbell, "Police Department Diseases," State
College, Pennsylvania, 1982.
(Typewritten.)
55Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 17.
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where one's staff fires the boss long before the boss is actually
terminated by the employing organization.

He goes on to say*'. .

it

is almost a syndrome ...» and specifies some of the synptcns to
include a decline in enthusiasm, morale, or quality of work; increased
grumbling about policies; and higher absenteeism.

He further suggests

"the best preventive medicine" as being a good system of constant
feedback. 58

Kets de Vries and Miller in their book The Neurotic

Organization use the term "Lone Ranger Syndrome," but in the context of
a defensive pattern.57

However, they make the observation that "...

we are able to identify the symptomatology of organizations,
particularly those that are performing poorly or are undergoing a
disruptive period of change."58

By conceptualizing, categorizing, and

explaining, organizational problem "frameworks" can then be applied to
help "diagnose organizational problems more quickly and
accurately .

. ,"59

As observed by this author, an organization may be at various
stages of developing the manifestations or symptoms of a syndrome.

It

has also been observed that an organization may work on more than one
syndrome at a time and, therefore, the syndromes will be at different

55Judy Linscott, "Bosses Who Don't care About People Could be
'Fired' by Employees," Centre Daily Times. 13 December 1984, p. B7.
57Kets de Vries and Miller, The Neurotic Organization, p. 164 - 165.
58 Ibid.
59Ibid.
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stages of developnent; sane say be fully developed and sane In just the
forming stages.
Another finding by the author is that a* syajrane can influence
(weaken) the organizational state and climate in such a way as to make
the organization susceptible to another syndrome.
As written by Kets de Vries and Miller, "the difference between
'normal' and 'neurotic' is one of degree . . ."60

so it has been found

by this author that even relatively healthy organizations manifest seme
of the symptoms of a syndrome, but the syndrome does not play an
important role in inhibiting the movement through the phases needed to
establish a condition supportive of equilibrium.

From numerous

diagnostic efforts syndromes seem to have an increasingly negative
impact on organizations as they evolve through the pre-crisis phases to
the crisis state.

In severe crisis states, the syndrome (often

several) becomes so pervasive in influence that the organization uses
up a major portion of its resources and managerial energies in
"feeding" or meeting the needs of the syndrome to ensure its full
actualization.

In other words, the syndromes as a generic group or

class of organizational equilibrium inhibitors become a "pseudo-goal"
to the host organization where the primary purpose of the organization
becomes secondary.

This acts to drain off reserve energies, resources,

and/or available time.

This draining process, labeled as "bleeders" by

this author, is often as damaging as the syndrome itself in that the
resources, time, and managerial energies typically needed to

60Ioid.
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proactively address a crisis situation are no longer available,

in

fact, the draining off process tends to cause the organization to
beoane increasingly inflexible to deal with the needed charge in that
the organization no longer has the resources needed.

Fbr example, the

climate that evolves from certain types of syndromes often is not
compatible with the needs of key technical and managerial employees
that could assist in the development of a turnaround.

Instead, these

employees are often seme of the first to leave the organization.
The study of the types and dynamics of syndromes and their
degenerative effect on organizations should be explored further by
organizational researchers.

It is felt that such research would lead

to greater understanding of the interactions of organizations in
crisis.
Numerous crisis management consulting assignments have allowed
several significant syndromes to be identified, analyzed, classified,
named, and observed in operative forms.

Eight such syndromes have been

observed to actively inhibit the formulation of a condition that allows
for equilibrium to occur.

These are discussed below.

The Suboptirum Entropy Reduction (SER) Syndrome basically operates
as the name implies.

The organizational entity creates its own "sub-

organization” that acts without consideration of the goals of the
parent organization and only cares about its own goal of reducing the
discomfort of being part of a degenerating organization.

The SER

syndrome exxurs when an organization internally evolves to counter and
fill a void created by an inappropriate managerial style which inhibits
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a "formal" management structure frcm forming.

Sea* of the primary

synptans include the following:
SSEtcffis:

Tcp management manifests unique am often counter-

productive behavior, such as:
-

Creating reactive department policies to "ccntoat" or respond to
individual or isolated employee behaviors;

-

Making hasty decisions and then countermanding them within a
very short period of time (for example:

suspending an employee

then allowing the employee to make-up money lost by scheduling
him/her for overtime assignments);
-

Acquiring organizational power through organizational confusion
created by rumor and conflict?

-

Paralyzed decision-making even when the "best" course of action
seems clear;

-

Rigidity in allowing change (even in routine day-to-day
situations such as scheduling);

-

Inability to be consistent in delegation of responsibilities—
often the responsibility is taken back or even abdicated;

-

Tendency to retain documents, materials, etc., beyond their
useful life or required purge cycle—basically for alleged
"CYA" purposes?

-

Failure to place himself/herself in critical situations where
leadership is necessary for fear of exposure to uncertainty in
his environment;

-

Reactionary management style.
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Subordinates manifest the following behavior:
-

A distinct change in organizational "climate" occurs when the
chief administrator is not present in ccnpariscn with the time

when he/she is present;
-

Middle management/supervision shows signs of frustration due to
role confusion or lack of role definition (may even resign
position);

-

Unit may consist (on the average) of an older group of
employees;

-

Attrition rate is not initially a serious problem, although it
logically should be;

-

Enployees exude a group closeness and general cooperation with
one another;

-

Enployees are quick to openly laugh at or chide the management,
tut are equally quick to defend the services or level of
production being provided;

-

Statistics will confirm services are being provided to the
community in spite of internal organizational problems (this
holds true for the public sector, but may not be the situation
in the private sector);

-

Although firm orders and policies are seldom stated with this
syndrome, when such are stated or occur, there is not a
predictable and direct cause-effect relationship or change in
the actual employee performanoe/behavior (similar to a
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situation where a steering wheel is not attached to the wheels
of a car);
-

Employees have a true sense of pride even to a point of havirg
a oonflict as to what really is the esprit de corps of their
work unit.

"Their" work unit has good morale, but the overall

"department” has poor morale.
Hie Deviation Anplifying Loop (DVAL) Syndrome is an often observed
syndrome in organizations in pre-crisis and crisis.

This syndrome

seems to often exist before others take clear form in troubled
organizations.

Although no rule can be generated from one's

experience, this writer would suggest to the serious organizational
diagnostic consultant that a time saving starting place to determine
the level of an organization's level of dysfunction is to start with
charting a "caused, map".
First described by Maruyama in 1963, this has been further applied
successfully to organizational events, specifically in the public
sector.

Che can identify such a syndrome when the primary

organizational components (variables) are charted in a causal map.
(Recently Bougon, Weick and Binkjorst? 1977, have reported using a
caused, mapping methodology to "make sense" of the organizational
declining process.)61

Taking one of the interdependent variables, a

pathway is traced until the interaction eventually leads back to the
original variable.

The caused reactions are charted as a positive

61Bougon, M., Weick, K., and Binkjorst, D., "Cognition in
Organizations: An Analysis of the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra,"
Administrative Science CUarterlv. 1977, Volume 22, pp. 606 - 639.
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reaction (ary variable increases the next variable's output) or
negative reaction (ary variable decreases the output of the next
sequential variable).

An even rumber of negative signs indicates a

deviation-sinplifying effect or loop.
Key organizational synptcms of the DVAL syndrome are:
-

Accountability is decreased (for exanple:

overtime is given

without well justified need or concern for fairness), stated
policies are vague, at best;
-

There is a rapid decrease in control and regulation of
departmental operations;

-

The work unit shows synptcms of instability and the increasing
degeneration of these synptcms (for exarple:

rumors are

circulated and become more bizarre);
-

Piecemeal efforts are attempted to solve specific problem
situations which result in little or no change;

-

Reorganization efforts do little to resolve the problem.

Erplcyee synptcms of the ENAL syndrome are:
-

Role confusion between elected officials/boards of directors,
and the chief executive officer/department heads;

-

Over-attention to details and interplay over critical incidents
within the department;

-

Desire to place blame or find a victim rather than identify the
solution;

-

Subliminal power struggles within the work unit and at the
policy making level;
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Lack of pro—active management;
-

Development ara^or selection of poor techniques or strategies
for coping with stress/anxiety;

-

lack of formal ccmmnicaticn procedures with the work unit
(monthly meetings, use of memos, etc.);

-

No vision or clearly defined future for the organizational
unit;

-

No formalized problem solving system (custcmer/citizen
complaint procedure) ?

-

Little supervision and on-line development of the core
operative personnel;

-

An analysis of the climate of the work unit is described as
cloudy or partially cloudy by the majority of the personnel;

-

Morale of the work unit is typically stated to be between 1 and
4 on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest) by the majority
of the personnel.

A diagram of hew this system can operate and cause further
degeneration is found in figure 10, found on page 103.

This exaitple

was developed to describe the dynamics operating in a specific client's
organization.
The third syndrome is the Organizational Internal Dissonance
Occurrence (OIDO) Syndrome.

This syndrome basically occurs where there

is an inproper aligning of one or more of dominant organizational
elements, such as:
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NOTE: A causal loop with an even number of negative signs
indicates a lack of regulation or control. Once a variable begins to
move in a particular direction (in this case down), the variable will
continue to move in that same direciton until the system is destroyed
or until sane dramatic change occurs.
FIGURE 10
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF DWAL (DEVIATION AMPLIFYING LOOP)
SYNDROME AS OPERATES IN DEPARTMENT/MANAGER
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Organizational/oorporate culture, including:

-

-

Power culture (source, intensity, vector, and valence) ;

-

Role culture?

-

Task culture (task cycles) ?

-

Person culture.

Environment adaptation, including:
-

Adaptation by deliberation;

-

Adaptation by reproduction;

-

Adaptation by differentiation (most often found in the
public sector).

-

Managerial style, including:
-

-

-

Fran autocratic to democratic.

Organizational structure, including:
-

Web/matrix;

-

Traditior^/hierarchial ?

-

Net;

-

Cluster.

Stage and cycle of organizational development, including
between work units.

-

Decision-making?

-

Work style preference - actual versus preferred.

This syndrome seems to be triggered by internal or external
stress, such as:

budget reduction, unusual personnel growth,
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improperly calculated "motivation calculus/*62 change in service
requirements (population decrease, rapid market share change, etc.) or
other factor(s).
Svnptcms:
Often explained as a "zig-zag" of the management from the body
of the organization.

This is where the department has changed

or is changing and one or more of the administrators/policy
makers are continuing on the former path while the body of the
organization is being directed towards a new path.
-

Work unit/chief executive offioer/employees lose credibility,
"can't be trusted," "don't knew if they are telling the truth,
exaggerating the real situation or just trying to build their
empire."

The main characteristic is mistrust of the

"reoamnended" solution put forth by the in-house experts or
change agents.
-

Complex "games" are played between work unit members, ranks,
positions, roles such as labor/management,
management/technical, mayor/administrator, sales/production.
Power struggles are not unusual.

-

Use of information is a major point of power or leverage as
well as its misuse.

-

"Idiosyncrasy credit" is in use (a leader's degree of freedom
relates to the amount of credits his/her group has given

62Charles B. Handy, Understanding Organizations (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 41.
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him/her for spending on "deviant" behavior-ooined by E. P.
Hollander, 1964).63
-

Employees (all levels) feel the "reality"

of

the jcb has not

lived up to the "urage" of the job presented by management
(dissonance theory—Hardy) .64
Often a work unit or department will manifest a ••proactive" or
even a secretive behavior.

For exairple, a police department might:

-

Classify all of their cases as confidential ?

-

Speak of '•political interference" with the department's
operations;

-

Suggest a "we against the world" attitude;

-

Provide extreme rationalization of failures or problems ;

-

Not offer open ocmnunication with elected officials;

-

Try to get members of the elected official body to be on "our
side" or suggest some are "pro-police" while suggesting others
are "anti-police";

-

Informal intimidation may be used such as "you have to be a
cop" to really understand, or "you should see our files on
_" (suggesting inproper activity by an elected
official);

-

"Poor morale" is used as the rationale for department
inefficiency.

63Ibid., p. 103.
64Ibid., p. 137.
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Often a process called "aimuniticn counting’' occurs in this
syndrcrae whereby each side openly reiterates to those not directly
involved how nuch evidence one has against one's foe.

This evidence is

treated like anmuniticn which is stockpiled? counted often; but seldcm,
if ever, used.

The age of this "ainamition" is often so old when

checked cut by an interventionist (scmetimes as old as six to eight
years) that it would not "fire" even if used.

The triage team knows

the crux of the problem is being addressed when the "counting" ceases.
The fourth syndrome is the Resource Imbalance Syndrome (RIS).
Sinply stated, this syndrome most often occurs in small organizations
or autonomous work units in rapidly changing environments.

Such

changes could be due to high technology advancement; "hot," highly
competitive and profitable markets? rapid population decrease or
increase; change in neighborhood make-up; or a tax base shift that
impacts the service department resources.

This can be a too rapid

budget increase due to external funds as well as too little.
In the business ccnirunity, a "boom time" that results in
uncontrolled growth often provides the condition for this syndrome to
develop.
Svnptcms:

Care should be taken that this syndrome is not confused

with the OIDO syndrome where "empire building" is one of its
characteristics.
-

Some general characteristics include;

A wide variance from the operating norm on any ’’benchmarking"
dimension used in the industry (for exanple:
unit ccnpared to costs of similar producers);

a high cost per
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-

low energy of employees (often expressed as low performance
rate, sick days, etc.) due to rotation and overtime fatigue;
High use of overtime required by managanent arri difficulty in
finding employees to work these time periods;

-

Short shifting?

-

Numerous schedule changes within short time period (often
schedule is changed even before it is posted);

-

Performance time increases as an average for the same time
period one to three years ago;

-

"Pockets" of boredom exist and employees try to create
challenges or diversions that may or may not be positive;

-

Overall image of operation is less than sharp—from dirty
equipment to dirty work area to poor personal appearance;

-

Budget adjustments are constantly taken from contingency fund
category or capital fund categories and budget overruns still
occur;

-

Needed equipment is often dcwn for repairs;

-

Role overload or underload exists in more than isolated cases
(under-employed or over-employed seems to be an operating
concept here).

The fifth syndrome is the Chronic Organizational Stress Reaction
(OOSR) syndrome.

In common terms, this occurs when the stress from

internal or external pressures gets to the point where change is very
necessary (even possibly for survival), but the tension from fear of
failure is so high that management is unable to take one more risk so
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they hold on to their unsatisfactory performance.

An analogy has been

nade of a driver at the wheel of a car cn ice that goes into a skid and
just clutches the wheel, doing nothing to react to reduce the skid.

Symptoms:
-

Significant resistance to change by administrators and top
policy makers.

No interest in change "sponsorship," but would

rather endorse a previous method of doing something, if
anything at all.
-

There is a general denied that a significant problem exists.

-

High attrition rate of more progressive personnel regardless of
age.

-

Early retirements often occur.

Decisions are put off or "tabled" for the next meeting.

(This

is often because of fear of the unknown—the unknown is
uncertain and unpredictable.)

The primary issue normally

revolves around the control and vulnerability of management.
-

Traditional solutions, management approaches, and tools that
have worked in the past do not seem to work new.

-

The stress shows itself in unusual defense manifestations;
i.e., tough behavior, passive aggressive behavior, approachavoidance, and in general, "resistant" attitude.

-

Attrition increases.

With this syndrome, management's inability to proactively address
the factors (internal and external) that are placing pressure on the
organization creates job tension for the employees.

The continuous

inaction by management to take corrective steps to reduce this employee
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job tension is interpreted by the agployees as lack of concern or even
lack of ocrmtinent on the part of management.

The employees at this

point start to experience both the feeling of job tension and
organizational abandonment or at least the withholding of the
organization's oamdtment to the employees.
will vary with each individual enployee.

The extent of this feeling

However, as these feelings

intensify, a withdrawal process begins to occur.

Once this state is

reached, given that the two basic conditions of job tension and low
organizational commitment continue, it is highly probable that the
individual will terminate his/her employment.
This whole process was developed and entitled as the "Cusp
Catastrophe Model of Enployee Turnover*' by Sheridan and Abel son
(1983) .65

Their follcw-up research suggested that once a threshold was

met or a "bifurcation plane" was crossed, termination would occur more
often than not.

This OOSR syndrome seems to often set up the condition

for the crossing of this "bifurcation plane."
As a note to organizational diagnosticians, one often finds a
"premature mortality" (Adizes, 1979, definitial) at me of the growth
cycles coupled with a growth stage dissonance (Gibb model, 1978) of two
or more stages between internally operating departments with the
identification of this OOSR syndrome.

Whether this situation exists

before or because of the syndrome is not known.
The sixth syndrome is the Foundation Degeneration Syndrome (FDS).
This syndrome could also be called the "false organization" in that

65Academy of Management Journal. 1983, pp. 418 - 436.
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several of the basic elements needed in a formal organization do not
exist.

Such elanents that should exist in a viable organization, but

may not exist or exist only partially in an TO affected organization
include:
-

Stated and understood mission, goals and/or objectives;

-

Stated in written form and passed by resolution-formal policy,
procedures, work rules, etc.;

-

Formal job descriptions, employment standards, selection
criterion exist;

-

Recognized leadership exists that can influence other key
members of the organization (no managerial vacuum exists);

-

Decision-making processes reduce the equivocality of an issue;

-

Personnel development and maintenance programs are in effect ;

-

Evaluation and feedback mechanisms exist and are in effect;

-

Stated linkages or relationships exist between organizational
elements and members;

-

Information handling is systematic with little "channel noise."

This syndrome seems to occur when the organization was not
"planned" or "designed" into existence, but evolved over time and the
increasing demand for service, product, accountability, and budget
controls created ,fbreak points" or organizational problems.
Svirptons:

Numerous key factors or organizational "building

blocks" are lacking that are required to form a strong organizational
foundation, as presented above.

Numerous "break points" will occur.
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These "break points" are often expressed in such ccnments or feelings

as:
-

"We have lost so nuch control that we never can get a case of
discipline to stick."

-

"Too much time is spent on paperwork."

-

"Why do the employees want to side-step their supervisor and
ccme to us (me) with their gripes?"

-

(The end run problem.)

Tcp management targets the department/capany as only a "chip"
to be used to gain other objectives (often personal agenda
items) or labels the department as a "necessary evil" that must
be put up with, but does nothing to advance the image/growth of
the cxxinunity/ccBpany.

Often these "break points" are rather subtly inferred, but are
important cues to the manager and consultant alike.

It should be noted

that this syndrome, left untreated, will most often lead to more
serious organizational problems.
The seventh syndrome is the Intervention Rejection Syndrome (IRS).
This syndrome only manifests itself when a change (intervention) is
made (or attempted) and the organization resists or even rejects the
intervention? be it a new system, disturbance of political equilibrium,
a new chief executive, changing policy, introduction to a new type of
technology, equipment, etc.

Normally this is a reaction to a fear that

a lack of control or that a position of vulnerability will result.
Also, IRS occurs when there is a difficult reality that has to be faced
by the organization.
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Svnptcms:
-

Sudden fornulaticn of a bargaining unit—even obtaining
national union affiliation;

-

Use of end runs to perceived "power individual" not directly
involved in the process;

-

Use of press coverage to present the position of the
department/ agency;

-

Direct challenge (or attack) to the change stated as:
-

"Give me more details so we can understand it";

-

Moralizing (makes use of phrases:

"those people" and

"should" and "they need to understand/' etc.);
-

Flooding the change agent with details of why it cannot
work;

-

Challenging the "base line data" as to accuracy of data
collection approach, analytical approach, etc.;

-

Intellectual izes or provides numerous theories of why things
are the way they are and why the intervention might not be
appropriate;

-

Confusion or "I don't understand" is expressed even after it
is clearly explained two or three times;

-

Silence (silence never means consent during an intervention
process).

-

Sudden state of "health" occurs—the problem has suddenly
diminished;
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Over-ccnplianoe

when a normally challenginj/aggressive manager

eagerly wants to knew what to do next;
-

"I am not surprised” approach when in reality surprise would be
a normal reaction;

-

Overt or covert sabotage of the project.

The eighth often observed syndrome is when the employees or staff
fire the boss, as described by Sherman and discussed previously.
Collectively, these syndromes represent seme of the more serious
inhibitors to setting-up the organization condition necessary to reach
the equilibrium needed for the change process to be completed.

More

simply stated, syndromes are really types of organizational illnesses.
When classified as such, it allows the organizational diagnostician a
point of reference or “working hypothesis" as to what is occurring in
an organization to cause the problem® manifested.

With experience, one

can relatively quickly "scan" a complex organization, hypothesize what
transactions are occurring within the organization, select the
appropriate organizational diagnostic tool or data collection method,
and analyze the results and verify the scope, depth, and source(s) of
the problem.

When organizations are in the pre-crisis phase or crisis

phase and organizational triage

(am)

methods must be employed, time is

often the enemy of the organization and ultimately to the
diagnostician.
Shortening the diagnostic time through such "scanning" techniques
that

the syndrome as a "working hypothesis" provides more time and

a better use of available financial resources so the time and resources
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left can be used on developing a program of treatment and implement irg
the treatment program identified.

In addition, the less time this

intervention process takes, the less organizational deterioration the
change sponsor and the change agent most address, and the less trauma
occurs to the target of the charge.

CHAPTER 4
ORGANIZATIONAL TRIAGE:

A CRISIS INTERVENTION MXEL

As a continuation of the development of the theory of
organizational degeneration and crisis formation, an operational
intervention model was developed by this student.
Stated in organizational developmental terms (from this student's
perspective), the goals of intervention during the crisis period should
be to:
1) .

Reduce the experienced sense of hopelessness, enabling the
organizational participants to retain a feeling of competence
and self-worth and reducing the feeling of inmediate
pressure.

2) .

Diagnose the maladaptive organizational manifestations and
their severity.

3) .

Identify the dominant organizational elements that are out of
alignment.

4) .

Open up channels of communication, create an aura of trust or
movement towards trust.

5) .

Determine what adaptive (coping) mechanisms have been
attempted and why they have failed.

6) .

Unfreeze behavior, decision-making, and managerial responses.

The model, labeled the "organizational triage model," enhances and
refines the crisis theory into an intervention model.
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Caplan developed
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symbols for portraying the crisis process.1

By his theory, when a

crisis terminates, the new adaption occurring

at

the end of the crisis

(new equilibrium) will result in a higher or lower level of adaption
than before the crisis.

He used a modified square root syntool (V—)

to relate the crisis process.

The horizontal line to the left of the

symbol represents the equilibrium that existed before the crisis.

The

sharp downward line represents the loss of functioning which happens
when the crisis is at its peak.
intensity of the crisis.

The length of the peak is the

The upward stroke indicates the new level of

equilibrium that has been attained.

The horizontal line to the right

is the new equilibrium that may be higher or lower than before the
crisis.

The conventional square root sign (-v/—) is the synbol of the

desired post-crisis outcome.
Adapting the symbol used by Caplan, Figure 11, found on page 118,
is a diagram of the model entitled "Organizational Triage Model:
Stages and Fhases."

The model depicts a sequencing of stages:

pre¬

crisis equilibrium; onset of degeneration profile; pre-crisis period;
crisis period; and new equilibrium.

Each of these stages is further

subdivided into phases for ease of understanding.
The organizational triage model begins with pre-crisis
equilibrium.
industry.

This would be the normal operating state for the

As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a normal level of

interaction between elements.

This would be shewn by a sine wave that

1g. Caplan, An Approach to Commnitv Mental Health (New York:
Grune and Station, 1961).
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will stay consistently between the organizationally established
operational norms and the legal and real resource constraints for the
organization.

This is a diagram of the normal operating, steady state

of a healthy organization.
The second stage is the onset of the degeneration profile.

This

degeneration occurs with misalignment of two or more dominant elements
In this second stage of the model, the formation of misalignment
between two or more of the dominant elements can be caused by:

the

trigger of a catastrophic event; the result of the erosion of an
organization's elasticity or the organizations's ability to resist
environmental (internal or external) pressures through adaptation or
absorption;2 inattention to proper organizational monitoring and
maintenance that keeps the organization within tolerable operating
parameters (often seen as managerial denial); and over-adjustment, too
little adjustment, or making adjustments too often (such as constantly
changing operations or monitoring reporting forms).

As seen in figure

11, found on page 118, the misalignment will occur, shewn as a downward
trend line.

The misalignment is then addressed and a new state or

organizational condition forms shown as the upward trend line.

In this

degeneration model, the upward trend line does not go all the way back

2Organizational absorption is a phenomenal most often observed by
this student when organizational change is introduced. The
organization absorbs the external change intervention effort into the
organization with no rejection, hut also with no change being
generated. Typically this is due to: selection of an intervention
protocol that is of too low order of magnitude; the intensity of
treatment is too little or takes too long to administer; or treatment
is used too often.
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to the previews state or condition.

Therefore, each next intervention

effort to address the misalignment starts at a lower point or point of
greater disadvantage.

A generation or developing organizational

profile would have the upward trend line always ending above the point
prior to the dip.

As can be seen, after the second iteration, the

starting point for the third intervention is even below the lowest
point of the first intervention effort.
The degeneration rate is linear at this second stage.

Equilibrium

is definitely impacted at this stage and manifested by the end of this
stage by the increased and consistent inability of the organization's
management to reduce equivocality.3
The pre-crisis period or stage of degeneration in the model has
three rather distinct phases.

Phase I is manifested as the rise of

inner tension, due to the formation of mistrust, conflict, and
ccmrunication breakdown.

Althcu^i this phase can be easily measured,

general interviews with the organizational members will quickly
indicate such problem manifestations.

Such comments as "we have a

ccmnunication problem" and "the morale is low here" are typical of such
a phase.

These are not the problems, tut are the result of the

misalignment problem.

Although the staff often will attest that

performance is "suffering greatly," actual performance audits will not
show a measurable reduction.

3Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2d ed.
(Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp.

.
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Cfcring this phase the organizational markers try to get the
attention of management to recognize the misalignment and correct it.
In the degenerative situation, such as diagranmed by the model on
figure 11, found on page 118, management, uncomfortable with the
synptcms of this degeneration, reacts in numerous ways.

Typical

maintenance managers look for a source of blame, most often quite
removed from the actual source, even external to the organization.

The

"former administration," the "national union," the 'Toad economy,"
"corporate policy," and the "microwave generation" are such exanples.
As shewn on figure 9, found on page 87, valuable time that could be
used to correct the misalignment is lost while the search for blame
continues.

Meanwhile, the misalignment increases which will require

even greater managerial efforts to correct.

Attempts are sometimes

made to correct the problems, as perceived, by increasing the use of
maintenance managerial reaction-type techniques which are most often
ineffective, such as reassigning problem task groups or individuals.
During this time period, the misalignment of the dominant elements
starts to create organizational blockages.

Although these blockages

can be in many forms, cxximjnication blockage is a classic example.
Where before verbal instructions and feedback were given, new written
documentation is required, often provided in a number of copies
requiring several signatures.

Form new takes precedence over function.

The attempts to resolve the areas of frustration only act to
increase the frustration in a degenerative organizational profile.
intervention used is often too late, too little, and applied at the

The
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syirpton.

The result is entry into Fhase II and the movement towards

the state of disharmonic resonance.
Fhase II is the formulation of negative coping mechanisns and is
exuded by at least a measurable number of the organization's link-pins.
The organization becomes "sick" in that its link-pins become weakened
due to the coping mechanisms employed, and the bonding action between
link-pins become weakened and less predictable.

The organization is

now more susceptible to degeneration at an ever increasing rate.
A link-pin, as used here, is an individual in an organization that
forms a point on which others in the organization can line up on and
often connect, either informally and formally.

Link-pins, as

individuals, act as intra- and inter-connectors between the members of
an organization.

An example of an individual acting as an intra-

connector is when one links two or more other individuals to form a
power pocket or influence group.

When the same individual acts to join

multiple power subgroups, he/she becomes an inter-ccnnector link pin.
Typically, inter-cxxinectors operate to link the different organiza¬
tional levels of hierarchy and to link unlike task groups, often
geographically separate.
The link-pin role is extremely important in this crisis theory in
that it is the ability, method, and completeness of the members of the
organization to align with the link-pins that provide a major source of
organizational alignment, ultimate equilibrium, and health.
The negative coping mechanisms are manifested as disbelief or
denial by maintenance managers, recrimination (or desire to punish or

123
get back at those that are causing this extreme discomfort), anger,
fear, and bizarre organizational behaviors, to name a few.

The bizarre

organization behaviors are what gives the organization its label of
being in crisis and becomes the source of news stories.

A classic

exanple, observed by this student, was the policy sent to all corporate
regional offices that, in order to cut costs and stop further profit
erosion, all travel was to cease.

Being a service cortpany that

required traveling to the customer to service existing contracts, the
policy was critically flawed and acted only to send a new shock of
uncertainty throughout the organization.

Another often seen, bizarre

organizational behavior is the passing of a baseless and damaging rumor
throughout the organization.

Organizations in the second phase often

rely on rumor to circumvent blocked formal ocnmunicaticn channels, and
therefore are susceptible to becoming victimized by such rumors.
As shewn on figure 11, found on page 118, the degenerative lines
are much longer during the pre-crisis period compared to the onset of
the degeneration profile.

These deeper downward thrusts with shallow

upward thrusts reflect the increasing deterioration of the
organization.

In other words, the organization is spending more of its

time in a state of decline than in corrective action.
The third phase is characterized as the movement towards
disorganization of function.

Non-performance is often measurable if

organization coping syndromes have not formed.

Often one or more

syndromes are formed and actively try to impede the further decline of
the organization.

A management or leadership vacuum often exists which
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acts to further escalate the degenerative process.

Personnel that are

easily employable outside the organization due to their expertise, arri
whose benefits, such as pension, do not preclude leaving the
organization, will leave during this time period.

Often interviews

reflect the majority of employees would leave if they could obtain the
same pay and benefits elsewhere.

During phase III, the image of the

organization as being in trouble becomes general knowledge in the
marketplace and it becomes hard to attract qualified replacement
personnel.

It is even more of a problem with attrition of key

personnel during a period when their informal leadership is the ally
effective leadership still holding the organization together.
At this phase, the organization is starting to absorb more of the
input resources for its own survival than for producing a product or
service.

Often the organization takes on a short-term reactive stance

with survival now being the primary driving mission.

The organization

« more control conscious, information is given cut based on a
strict need-to-know policy, and mistrust becomes rampant.
phase "power pockets" form to challenge management cpenly.

Curing this
Often the

organization members search for a "white knight" to save them.
Typically one or more maverick employee(s), often of lew level
supervision status that are frustrated with their rate of promotion,
announce their candidacy by challenging management in front of others,
such as at a staff meeting or at a special meeting called to address
the unrest.

Most often the attempt to gain leadership in this manner

is unrealized in that the bonding of the organization is no longer
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predictable and the grass roots support needed from the esiployee
mentoership cannot be formed.

The result is the candidate recognizes

his/her sudden lack of support and the unrealistic risk he/she is
taking and the leadership attempt fails.

This candidate often is

damaged for the rest of his/her career.
Recognizing that such exposure is not worth the benefits, the
power pockets turn to guerrilla tactics which can include vandalism,
sabotage, and other extreme organizational performance perturbations.
Often the role of "negative organizational escalator" forms which acts
as the "bullet maker" or tactician who plots actively against the
organization, but uses others to "fire the bullets."

At this point,

the organization is all too often in such a disarray that it cannot
adequately counter the assault from within and the organization reaches
a new intolerable level of disorganization or disequilibrium.
Disharmcnic resonance is now established, the organization utility
index is now zero or below, and degeneration occurs at a geometric
rate.

The organization is in crisis or the crisis stage.
The crisis period or Phase IV of the model, as shewn in figure 11,

found on page 118, is characterized by such phenomena as:

panic;

managerial paralysis; support system ossification; collapse; nonfunctioning; total focus on survival; shock; uncertainty;
organizational chaos; radical treatment for survival; and radical
change tactics.

The degeneration of the organization is such that

seldom, if ever, can there be a turnaround without external
intervention.

Without intervention a for-profit organization is
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terminal.

If the organization is artificially kept alive, due to its

being a vital public service or given support by private or public
funding infusions, the organization will deteriorate to a survival
mode.

Often the organization becomes corrupt to the point the illegal

activity is institutionalized, the operating systems atrophy, arri/or
bonding of elements becomes only self-serving to the point of
militancy.
The Fhase IV part of the model introduces the organizational
triage (OIR) intervention process needed to reverse this crisis
profile.

At this point in the organization's decline, the level of

managerial skill needed to obtain a turnaround, as experienced by this
student, will need to be nothing less than organizational heroics.

The

management focus should be on changing behavior and not on "attitude
change."

Applying imperfect solutions to major areas of misalignment

is preferable to fine tuning excellent solutions that only address a
small segment of the problem.

The organization, at this point, is most

often working on its financial reserves, if any are left.

The key to

turnaround at this point is speed which is caused by time pressure due
to rapidly depleting resources.

This factor alone takes most of an

organization's management cut of action in that their previous
inability to handle the degeneration was largely due to hesitation and
not taking decisive action.

The level of decline at this point further

aggravates the problem in that managers tend to "freeze up" due to the
trauma of the situation.

In other words, the stress of the situation

has passed beyond the point of being motivating to new being
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deactivating.

Hie student has observed many organizations at this

state and the actions of managers become "the load has been lifted from
my shoulders" or where they have made peace with theieelves that it is
exit of their control.
agendas.

They new expend their efforts on personal

Where before they would be staying up all night to coordinate

getting an inportant proposal cut, they take the day off and go golfing
and often do not return in time even to sign the proposed transmittal
letter.

Often lower level managers abruptly leave the organization,

almost as if they want to punish the organization for not allowing them
to play a more important part in the declining organization.

As a

result, the connecting points, these managers, needed to link the
turnaround management team to the formal in-crisis organization are
damaged and a transition from in-crisis management leadership to
turnaround management leadership is, at best, difficult.
Therefore, the need for speed in treatment dictates the treatment
intervention process.
stage."4

Bibeault cedis this state the "emergency

He goes on to write that in this problem stage the

organization "doesn't have time for big studies . . .,"5 tut he warns
"don't jump into the fire fight without a plan" as in the fray "one
will lose the perspective."

He recognized that it is normal to be

tempted to jump in without such a plan.6

4Donald B. Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—Hew Managers Turn
losers into Winners (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Ccnpany, 1982), p. 99.
5Ibid., p. 96.
6Ibid., p. 97.
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CflR Intervention
In this student's model, the first organizational triage (on*)
intervention stage is the assessment process.
this is a multiple step process.

However, in reality,

First, as shown in figure 13, found

on page 137, the leadership for the turnaround process has to be
identified.

This typically is an individual that the organization can

support with their sponsorship.
manager.

This individual needs to be a crisis

The optimum profile would be someone that:
enjoys stress and conflict;
has a high "RFM" or the ability to coordinate many tasks
simultaneously and can "change channels" easily;
does not become confused or deviated from the task by
emotion, implied pressure, or personal agendas;
recognizes that change in behavior is the only variable
he/she can control as a crisis manager and that "attitude
change" is of no value at this point;

-

recognizes that an imperfect solution that addresses eighty
percent of the problem is better than an excellent solution
that addresses twenty percent of the problem, but that takes
three times longer to achieve;7
has high mental agility;
is assertive and exudes an "in control" presence;

-

is strong in verbal communication skills;
is tough-minded and seemingly tireless;

7Ibid.
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has a positive mental attitude;
has the ability to draw clear lines of what is appropriate
behavior and can consistently apply the treatment, regardless
of the recipient of the treatment;
has a strong ability to "sell" his/her point of view by being
able to relate to the change and move the target to his/her
point of view;
has a well-develcped base in organizational behavior and

am

technology;
has experience in conducting or participating directly in
other turnaround efforts;
has the ability to create an informal power base;
has the ability to quickly regain "idiosyncrasy credit"8 lost
by judgement error.
This individual typically has a "cluster" management style and operates
at a Stage I (highly directive) or II (family) level of organization
development and leadership.

In other words, he/she becomes the "star"

in the turnaround performance.

Most often these individuals ccme from

outside of the troubled organization.

In fact, this student has never

seen it done otherwise and work successfully.
The "star" selection process needs to be precise to ensure that
all the necessary traits are present.

This student developed an

assessment process specifically for this part of the COR process called

8Charles B. Handy, Understanding Organizations (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 103.
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"Assessment Plus."

This selection process has been proven highly

predictable and successful.

Simply, the process measures the

organization in its level of development and decline and identifies the
specific minimum skill level that is needed to addh>rs the
organization.

The candidates are then measured using a series of

assessment instruments, all purchased from outside vendors.

Typically,

sixty to eighty dimensions are measured and are developed into a
profile which is then compared to the "desired" profile.

The closer

the fit the greater the probability of the candidate's success.
The person selected for this "star" position must realize that
this is a temporary heroic role that must not be continued after the
organization has reached a new state of equilibrium.

Often crisis

managers are so excellent at what they do that they cannot adjust back
to a more maintenance managerial style.

Therefore, these cluster star

managers must be replaced at the end of the turnaround process;
otherwise, they create crises to resolve and the organization never
reaches a true level of equilibrium.
In some cases, the "star" selection process needs to cone later in
the OIR process if the organization is not ready to sponsor the OTR
intervention.

In these situations an external intervention consultant

team is utilized in a leadership role.

This student has found that the

private sector tends to be much more ready to accept OTR treatment
since their own resources are being depleted.

In the public sector the

organization's sponsor of the OIK intervention must be readied.

This

is more difficult for the urgency of intervention is not as often felt
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because the resources available are not directly related to
performance, in a publicly funded organization.

The depletion of

financial reserves motivates in the private sector while this is
secondary in the public sector.

Image is the primary motivator in the

public sector, which cones from the individuals providing the service.
However, organizational maintenance and development becomes as
important in the public sector, as in the private sector.
The next step in the OTR intervention process is to form a triage
team.

The leader selects his/her team based upon expertise,

availability, and ability to form a synergistic tram through quick
bonding.

This student's experience suggests a team of at least two

members.

The number of members is based on two factors:

the size,

level of degeneration, and complexity of the organization; and the
complexity of the organization and the amount of external force or
influence that needs to be added to stabilize the organization.

The

team must be balanced in expertise and leadership style which is not to
suggest the team members need to have the same expertise and
personalities.
There are three roles to be filled.

Om role is the leader role.

The second role is the expert role which provides the understanding of
how the problem degeneration evolved and defines the dominant
organizational elements and their dynamics or interactions with each
other.

The third role provides creative solution development,

unencumbered with the desire to save face, one's position, or the
responsibility for carrying a tradition.

The first and second roles
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can join together to play the third role, if necessary,

if the second

role or expert role is provided from within the organization, it cannot
be part of the current power base that needs to be shifted or could be
subject to job termination by the process.

Since intervention at this

crisis stage very often requires surgery,9 this criterion for selection
is most important.

It is recommended not to use internal

organizational team members, from this student's experience and others
(Bibeault).10
Hie triage team's first task is to quickly assess the state of the
organization.

A key requirement for a successful organizational triage

(OIR) intervention is the ability to discern between dominant and
recessive elements in that valuable time can be lost in aligning
recessive elements that will have no significant impact in stabilizing
the organization.

It has been observed, on occasion, that consultants

c^n to have a "treatment" of which they are fond or with which they
feel comfortable and they often proceed to recommend this treatment for
every problematic case.

The result often provides a classic example of

dealing with a recessive element that has no real value in addressing
the larger problems of the organization.
Bibeault points cut at this critical stage ocnputers are useless
and a sharp pencil and a good mind are most needed. ^

This assessment

9Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—Hew Managers Turn losers Into
Winners, p. 99.
10Ibid., p. 97.
^Ibid., p. 99.
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process is where the term "triage" best applies.12
process has two primary objectives.

The assessment

The first is to allow the triage

team to understand the situation sufficiently and the second is to
develop a plan of action.13
The process scans the misaligrraent of dominant elements that are
most exposed and prioritizes what needs to be
which will have the greatest turnaround inpact.

first, that
The assessment process

should normally take only a few days, at most, in the private sector
and a few weeks, at most, in the public sector.

However, this part of

the triage process is most necessary for success.

Since there is

always a honeymoon period with the entry of the team, this time can be
used for the assessment process.14
Typically in a declining organizational state, marketing, parts of
production/service, and top management are the most exposed sectors.15
Therefore, this is where the assessment begins.

This student has found

that management is clearly first in importance to the reversed process;
where the surgery often needs to occur; and the area that played the
major part in creating the crisis state.

The "bleeding" of the

organization is often through production or the service provided, which
makes it next in importance.

Part of the triage approach is to step

12 Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 96.
14Ibid., p. 97.
15Handy, TTrYterstandina Organizations, p. 199.
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the "bleeding" of resources that is ever-increasing the shortness of
time to turn around the organization.16
As has often been said by Bibeault and others,17 "cash is king"
during a turnaround in the private sector.
a human undergoing surgery or treatment.

Cash is not unlike blood to
The life blood for triage in

the public sector is information, with cash being second, from this
student's experience.

Information leakage or uncontrolled "bleeding"

of information paralyzes the elected official which in turn will not
allow the triage process to continue as the change sponsorship is
removed.
Marketing is important to both the public and private sectors.
Too often the lack of marketing in the public sector is me of the
major sources of misalignment.

"Perception of service" most often

precedes the actual service request, which is the controlling factor in
obtaining the necessary resources to operate the organization.
Additional purposes of the assessment process are to:

obtain change

sponsorship; gain credibility so the team is given the freedom of
implementation; identify the turnaround leverage point(s); verify and
reaffirm the sponsor's perception that the organization is in crisis or
clearly establish a true level of dissatisfaction with the current
state of operations and organization in the sponsor; and identify the

16Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—How Managers Turn losers into
Winners, p. 98.
17Ibid., p. 99.
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c°re business or service that is the "mother lode"18 that must be
protected throughout the triage process.
The format of the triage assessment is often not extremely formal
in terms of text, but is very specific in the identification of
dominant elements cut of alignment and the benchmarking of the extent
of this misalignment.

Armed with this assessment, the next process is

the treatment protocol selection.

Selection of Treatment, Protocol
As can be seen in figure 12 found on page 136, the organizational
triage treatment protocols overlap, tut are significantly different
from the organization development protocol.

An overview of the

selection logic used to identify the proper level of treatment for any
phase of the organizational degeneration is outlined in diagram form in
figure 13 found on page 137 entitled:
Degeneration Intervention."

18Ibid., p. 103.

"Protocol Selection Process for
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Level 1:

Salvage Protocol
Organizational
Development
Process

Level 2:

Treatment Protocol
Organizational
►
Triage
Process

Level 3:

Surgery Protocol

Level 4:

Organizational Termination
FIGURE 12

LEVELS OF raeociaRATION INTERVENTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND TRIAGE PROCESSES:
A COMPARISON

For a Phase IV crisis state, only two intervention protocols are
available.

These are, first, the treatment protocol and second,

surgery protocol which can be used on an individual or task group.

The

key is to select whatever protocol will ensure survival by allowing the
organization to stabilize itself temporarily so realignment of the most
critical dominant elements becomes possible and a state of turnaround
occurs and healing begins.
To reduce the diagnostic and decision-making time, this student
developed an algorithm of over eight hundred decision points and action
blocks entitled "Organization Degeneration Intervention Algorithm"
(ODIA).

Under the guidance of this algorithm the point of intervention

can be determined and the level of intervention can be selected, being
either the salvage, treatment, or surgery protocols or a decision can
be

to allow termination.
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The salvage protocol is the least severe.

This protocol is best

applied in the earliest stages of misalignment and pre-crisis.

It is

basically manipulation of misalignments through the clear
identification of the elements affected.

By focusing attention on

these misaligned dominant elements, they tend to adjust themselves.
Strengthening of the desired, formal bending relationships that are
aligned with informal relationships has been found helpful to minimize
further degeneration.

This student has been able to do this through

the assistance of a type of organizational power "X-ray1' that measures:
vector/valence (ability to informally influence and the intensity of
that influence); cohesive index; "RFM" level; leadership effectiveness
index (flexibility); and stress score.

With this power charting

approach, this student has been able to increase the power of the
organizational diagnostics and the consultant's confidence in where to
adjust the formal and informal link-pins and how to strengthen the
linkage alignments once adjustments have been made.

The salvage

protocol also places special emphasis on establishing new goals and
evaluation criteria to reduce the uncertainty and increase system
integration.19
The treatment protocol focuses, as one of its approaches, on the
identification of specific managerial skill, personality, knowledge,
and ability deficiencies that cause misalignment.

The treatment can be

through the development or extinguishing of dominant managerial skill

19John R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The
Jossey-Bass Inc.,
Publishers, 1981), p. 369.

Organizational t.i fe cycle (San Francisco;
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elements to increase one's ability to effect proper aligrment between
elements one has to manage.

Standard organizational development

methods are often employed such as strategic planning, team building,
trust enhancement, and quality circles, to mention a few.

often the

focus is to remove organizational "blind spots" so realignment can be
facilitated.
Typically, solutions to organization misalignment are only sought
near the problem area.

This seems to increase as the organization

degenerates and stress increases.

Therefore, the solution is often not

the optimal solution because the full range of alternatives were not
able to be considered.

The treatment protocol addresses this issue

very effectively, especially in Ihase II and Phase III of the pre¬
crisis period.

At Phase IV the treatment protocol is often used in

concert with the surgery protocol.
The surgery protocol speaks for itself.

Once the intervention

protocol selection and strategy has been made and the leverage point
identified, the triage team is ready for inplementation.

It should be

noted that turnaround leverage is much greater when applied by an
outside triage team than an internal manager, and therefore the
irrplementaticn should not be handed off to an internal team at this
point in time.
The first part of the inplementation of the intervention is to
stabilize the organization.

This has been called by many names

temporary steady state, homeostasis, freezing, and quasi-stationary
equilibrium, to name a few.

This is the stage where the degeneration
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process ceases to continue and further decline is suspended.

This is

necessary to relax the organizational element linkages that are being
stretched and pulled cut of alignment so they can be affected by the
introduction of the triage turnaround leverage point.

This stage is

diagrammed as shewn on figure 11, found on page 118, as a flat tip.
Theoretically speaking, the sum of the vectors or influence of all
dominant elements should equal zero, as discussed an page 69.

This

does not suggest any lack of dynamism, but rather provides an
opportunity for the turnaround leverage point when pushed to be able to
have enough directional force or vector to be a catalyst to initiate
the realignment process.

This student is continuously surprised at the

very little vector that is needed to be introduced to start the
turnaround when a true temporary, steady state has been established.
The true measure of an experienced triage team is how little turnaround
leverage pressure is required.
Once the primary dominant elements are realigned, the triage
application ends.

At this stage a long-term regeneration development

plan is developed with the new management team that has been
identified.

The temporary leader either is reassigned, required to

change management style, or is removed.

If the individual is not

removed, a new set of organizational stressors will typically develop
that can create a new misalignment.

The only alternative is to adjust

the culture to assimilate this individual's style, tut such is only
practical when the organization is small, not complex in terms of task
performed, or the individual has ownership of the organization.
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At this juncture, the OUR team must leave the organization
physically.

If they continue to operate, the organization will reject

the team and the organization coping mechanism manifested as the
formation of an Intervention Rejection Syndrome (IRS).

with this

syndrome the whole treatment intervention previously introduced comes
into challenge and the organization degenerates to a new low with
termination of the organization often the result.
The triage treatment intervention is reviewed and continually
monitored thrcu^i the formal feedback from the management team.

The

changes that do not occur are restructured and submitted to the now
legitimate management team.

The triage intervention is now completed

and the organization leaves Fhase IV.

The crisis period is over.

The

goals after this crisis period are:
1) .

Enable all involved to fully regain their self-worth along
with acceptance of the new state-of-affairs.

2) .

Enable the organizational parts involved to continue
realistic and adaptive action.

This would include

maintenance of available relationships and development of
new, adaptively useful ones,20
3) .

Develop long-range adaptive growth from the experience.

4) .

"Tune-up" managerial and operational processes to establish a
level of operations that will improve the characteristics of

2°m.

J. Horowtiz and Nancy B. Kaltrieder, "Brief Treatment of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders," New Directions for Mental Health
Services, ed. Gerald F. Jacobsen (San Francisco, California: Josseyftagg inc. f Publishers, 1980), p. 69. Adaptation of Horowtiz concept.
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the new equilibrium that is more adaptive, monitoring, and
sensitive to problem influences and external stimuli.

5).

Create a new proper alignment of dominant organizational
elements to achieve maximal organizational utility.

Using standard organizational development technology the
organization continues to heal.

Externally the organization's new

wellness needs to be marketed so a new accurate image can be fostered
that will correct any remaining negative perceptions the degenerative
period left on its clients, customers, and peer groups.

The

organization is then, in essence, reconnected to its suppliers,
financial institutions, customers, and potential employee pool.

Often

degeneration causes the applicant pool of excellent candidates to dry
up and the reconnecting process is especially necessary with search
firms, training schools, and educational institutions that produce such
candidate pools.
Finally, a new equilibrium is established and, as shown in figure
11, found cxi page 118, it is at a higher level of organizational
utility than before the degeneration.
healthy and can become synergistic.

The organization is once again
Organizational degeneration is

rather straightforward in theory, but complex in application, as shown
in the triage model.
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Intervention Strategies and Qhservaticra
Based on Field Experience
Rcwe and Mason write:
"Recognizing that alignment is important, what can be done to
correct a situation in which there is misalignment7 The
following are a number of potential interventional approaches
that can be used to improve alignment:
(1) a charge in
organization structure and/or realignment of authority of
responsibility; (2) effective selection of individuals on the
basis of both qualifications and style; (3) improved
counseling and/or training regarding career selection and
career paths; and (4) consideration of style as a means to
evaluate relationships between the individual and peers
and/or superiors.”21
The triage intervention purpose is twofold.

One, to create a

temporary steady state or equilibrium for the traumatized organization.
This intervention is necessary in order to establish an organizational
climate conducive to accepting the change.

Two, to select and

the dominant elements most cut of alignment that will have the greatest
impact on reversing the organizational decline in the shortest time.
The shorter the time, the greater the change momentum, the more
predictable that the change will be internalized, the less damage is
sustained, and the shorter and more complete the healing.
This student has found that removal of the primary obstruction has
the greatest effect on creating an organizational environment receptive
to other change.

To do this the organization triage sponsor, i.e., the

board of directors, elected officials, etc., must learn to put trust in
the triage tpam or external consultant that the removal process will

21Alan J. Rowe and Richard 0. Mason, Managing with Style:—A Guide
to Understanding. Assessing, and Improving Decision Making (San
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1987), p. 63.
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not further the degeneration by being too little, too late,

ihe

removal of a key manager (surgery) ia most often a "process" aid not a
simple act of removal if law suits and a "palace guard" backlash are to
be avoided.
Having orchestrated the removal of many CEO's and senior managers,
this student kncws that the desire to leave has to acme from within the
person to be removed.

The triage removal strategy is to give the

targeted individual the requirement (through a "contracting" process)
to achieve a series of task objectives that represent the weak areas
that are significantly contributing to the decline of the organization.
A very firm time frame is set, specific quantifiable measures are
identified, and a team is selected to monitor the progress, formally
report the results, and provide feedback to the targeted individual.
The failure to achieve the objectives is (kxumented.

Since the

targeted individual "contracted" for his/her own time frame for
achieving results, the completion time cannot be a source of excuse.
The individual recognizes the failure to achieve, even if he/she will
deny the reason, which is often self-generated.

This pressure (stress)

increases until the threshold of job dissatisfaction is met and since
organization cxananitment is removed, as part of the triage strategy, the
condition has been met for a resignation.

To be successful, the

objectives have to be real, fairly monitored, and honest feedback roust
be provided.

If the person meets the objectives, he or she stays and

the blockage behavior has been removed as the result.
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The removal sends a clear message throughout the organization that
the decline is being proactively addressed.

As an indicator that a

temporary steady state is occurring, the panic leaving of the
organization typically decreases significantly as the turnaround plan
is endorsed by the triage intervention sponsor and internalized by the
organizational members.

The organizational climate is now "cooled" and

the organization is ready to receive the process to realign the nest
dominant elements impacting the decline.
The element realignment part of triage starts with the
identification of "bleeders" that are being allowed to draw off needed
resources.

Such bleeders" can range from having to

with a team

or individual that takes a disproportionate amount of management's
time, to poor quality control that results in customer returns, to
product lines that are no longer profitable.

Again, surgery is the

prescribed intervention protocol.
The misalignment of the key dominant elements that are negatively
inpacting the organization and fueling the crisis requires a very
tailored approach.

Most dominant elements have a "spark plug" or

"trigger" that sets off another cycle of degeneration.
must identify this trigger point if possible.

The triage team

A trigger point can be

as subtle as using a single word that acts to "replay" an error made by
<ytnp task group, thus maintaining a disconnect between two key task
groups, which sets off a whole new series of defending activities.
Other triggers can be symbolic behaviors only significant to that
organization.

For example, yelling at a supervisor in front of his/her
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subordinates which telegraphs the message that the supervisor's role is
not held in any higher regard than the lowest employee and that the
whole work force is comprised of "little people" who require no respect
or dignity from management.

Any efforts to align the employee with the

management team will fail as long as the trigger of yelling within
earshot of the subordinates is continued—even as

as

a

year.
Once the dominant elements are misaligned and their triggers are
identified, a detailed strategy needs to be developed to bring about
alignment.

Most often alignment is a multiple step process where

pressure is applied initially at a point which is comfortable and on
the surface easy to change.

In other words, the pressure point does

not directly act to threaten or increase the stress of the already
stressed out group or individual.
As an example, members of a board of directors were in serious
conflict with each other and threatening to destroy an established,
well known, and formally profitable organization.
diagnosed as a bifurcation of the board.

The misalignment was

One group had a Stage I

orientation to management policy formulation and the other had a Stage
III orientation, as defined earlier on pages 64 and 65, which was
created by acute cultural dissonance.
The first step of the alignment process was to remove the board
members to an off-site location where they could not damage on-going
operations.

The power or influence vectors and valences, as defined on

page 69, were calculated for each board member and the level of
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external influence needed to neutralize the group was determined.

A

triage team of three members was required to add the counter-balance
necessary to get the board members' attention and maintain a steady
state as behavior changes were introduced.

The first work session

required them to "contract" to do only one thing the triage team
suggested and they as a group would agree to.

After breaking up a

fist fight which occurred in the first five minutes of the session, the
board members power was neutralized in that no one subgroup was allowed
to dominate the other subgroup.

The resulting effort was for them to

write a mission statement to which they could all agree.
They were next instructed to have this framed in molded brass and
hang it in their board room.

They were next instructed that before the

start of each future board meeting one member had to physically get up
and go over to the plaque and read it aloud to the rest of the group.
Although sirtple in process, the bifurcation that existed melted away
over a period of less than a year and the board was brought back to
meet on location.
is over.

The perception by rank and file is that the conflict

Top management is once again fully able to key on or align

philosophically and operationally with the Board.
Although a sinple illustration, it shows that alignment is varied
and oftentimes more subtle than the crisis situation would suggest.
The designer of the intervention has to be careful that the
intervention does not become "heroic" instead of realigning.
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Sane general guidelines that have proven useful by this student in
developing the proper solutions or intervention strategies are as
follows.
1).

The greater the crisis the organization is experiencing, the
more one should consider surgery.

Surgery is used best to

break counter-productive managerial bending and to stop
organizational hesrorrhaging.

It has a secondary effect of

shocking the organization which can act to realign the
dominant elements.

It also telegraphs a clear message to

those undecided employees that radical and significant
change is going to occur and they should align themselves
with the next leadership as the former leadership no longer
has the power to create further misalignment or act as a
buffer to the realignment process.

If the surgery protocol

is selected, all surgery should be done at the same time.
Since an organization cannot be given anesthesia, all parts
to be effected by the surgery protocol should be addressed
in the same, quick time frame.

Surgery that is spread out

over several weeks often increases the healing time as the
needed trust for healing is shattered.

In other words, the

surgery should be clear to all members of the organization—
who or what is to be removed and a statement that those
remaining have nothing to fear.

To remove people at

unstated intervals creates fear initially, then anger, and
finally mistrust.

The greater the mistrust the more
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difficult the healing process is for those who remain.

As

Bibeault writes, surgery should be performed in "one
step.»22

Along with the surgery there should be seme

reaffirmation that the surgery is circumscribed and that
those remaining are fully part of the turnaround team and
long-term solution.

If possible, a symbol of verification

should be made as an observable gesture of this statement.
This gesture should not be a gift as this signals to the
recipient that the triage management team is feeling
uncertain, guilty or needs support and approval and is
willing to pay for it.

A gift such as a team t-shirt or a

cenpany irug is easily rejected without any loss to the
employee and it makes an even greater statement in the form
of a physical symbol of rejection.
2).

Select a solution that unloads those individuals or groups
that do not quickly get into alignment.

Regardless of their

expertise value, the synergistic value of the new team
effort will successfully ccnpete with a "star" performer and
the expertise loss will soon be regained.

This has been

proven numerous times, from this student's experience, and
is reinforced by Bibeault and others.23

Those individuals

or task groups that are cut of sync with the realignment
process are, by definiticxi, dominant elements.

22ibid., p. 99.
23lbid., p. 97.

The
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overriding objective of the triage intervention is to
adcir^?&s those dominant elements most out of alignment which
in this case would be these individuals or task groups.
3) .

Do not select a surgery protocol that will damage the
business core if it is still viable in the market place.
Multiple cores are possible in large organizations, but an
organization in crisis cannot effectively respond when they
have numerous service or product fronts to protect.

The

primary "mother lode," as suggested by Bibeault,24 should be
identified and only the core sheltered during the Phase IV
triage intervention phase.
4) .

Select a treatment protocol, if determined to be most
beneficial, that is most in alignment with the values and
culture of the sponsors.

As Handy affirms, the management

of crisis must override ccnmittees, rules, and procedures to
be successful, and therefore will need to rely on political
support of the sponsors.25

After the crisis period has

ended, a maintenance management team will next need to be
formed to develop the formalization of rules, procedures,
regulations, and formal controls to maintain the newly
created equilibrium.

In the same context, the communication

chain must be as short as possible between the triage team

24Ibid., p. 96.
25Handy, TTiyterstanflina Organizations, p. 200.
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and the sponsor as often decisions will need to be mvia
quickly, and formal, pre-existing channels are insufficient.
5) .

Based on experience and Bibeault's writings,26 the design
and selection of a proper intervention strategy should not:
-

be too critical of solutions available, as timeliness is
most important.

-

require a lot of justification to the sponsor.

-

try to address all misalignments or problems as only the
primary ones are addressed under the triage concept.

-

identify problems without solutions already developed as
this cxily acts to escalate the trauma of the crisis state
and delays the turnaround.

-

share the plan with anyone without the real power in the
turnaround situation or who does not have a stake in the
implementation, as random sharing of information allows
critique to surface from the still powerful but
misaligned power pockets, which could confuse the
sponsor.

Typically a change agent wants to affirm

his/her plan with the target and employ as much
involvement as possible into the planning process, tut a
crisis state differs significantly in this respect.
6) .

Select a plan of intervention that will immediately address
the major points of misalignment and that will also

26Bibeault, Corporate Turnaround—Hew Managers Turn losers into
Winners, p. 97.
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establish a leverage point for a turnaround.

Oftentimes the

best turnaround leverage point is singular and requires a
ccnprcmise by the sponsor on an issue on which they desired
to hold firm in the past.
7) .

Care should be taken that the synptan is not being addressed
rather than the source of the misalignment.

Syndromes, by

their very nature, can mislead even the most skilled
organizational diagnostician if a second and third
verification is not used such as the use of organizational
diagnostic instrumentation, hard data verification, and
direct observation.
8) .

Incremental responses to Fhase IV organizational crisis is
never adequate and provides a false start that acts only to
magnify the radical changes that most be made later to
correct the incremental response error.

9) .

Application of the wrong level of solution to the right
problem is not effective.

Selecting a "softer"

organizational development intervention process, when an
organizational triage process is required, will only use up
the scarce time needed for a turnaround and act to escalate
the decline.
10).

Surgical intervention that is premature, and thus by
definition unnecessary or ineffectual in attaining the
desired goal, is a burden to the recipient organization due
to loss of a needed resource and decreased morale.

It also
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creates an increased risk to the organization due to the
increased exposure to law suits.

Therefore, there is an

cptiman time for each type of intervention strategy.
11).

The misalignment of dominant elements must clearly be
understood.

There are two factors that must be measured and

considered.

The first factor is the intensity or grade

level of the misalignment.

The second factor is the

dimension of the misalignment.
dimensional misalignments.

There are three possible

The first misalignment is uni¬

dimensional where one element is involved.

The second is

niilti-dimensional, where two dominant elements are out of
alignment and are logically related to each other and both
are on the same task or structural level within the
organization.

The third, poly-dimensional misalignment,

exists when two or more dominant elements are out of
alignment representing two or more levels within the
organization, such as managerial style and employee group
misalignment.

The higher the grade and the more dimensions,

the more severe the misalignment.

For example, a high

grade, poly-dimensional misalignment of dominant elements
most often exists in a Phase III or Phase IV state of
crisis.
12).

The trigger point or catalyst that has initiated the
misalignment should be determined.

For example, if an

organization's cohesiveness index is high, or over .5, and
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the trigger points are not being reported (via interview or
instrument) with any consistency or trend, and the stress
•jvr-'iA national Role Stress Scale) 27 instrument results do
not provide a pattern, external degeneration trigger stimuli
are suggested.

This student has also observed that when the

cohesiveness is lew and disparity exists in trigger
response, it is most likely that a destructive
organizational state is well on the way to being developed
for the task group and the organization will not be
providing any significant organizational utility.

27Udai Pareek, "Organizational Role Stress Scale," The 1983 Annual
for Facilitators. Trainers, and Consultants, eds. Leonard D. Goodstein
and J. William Pfeiffer (San Diego: University Associates, Inc.,
1983), p. 115 - 123.

CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZATIONAL TRIAGE:

OBSERVATIONS AND CCNCUJSICNS

Although other organizational treatment theories and concepts
exist, the COR descriptive and prescriptive theory, as developed in
this dissertation, does not conflict with these existing theories.
Instead, the OIR model could provide a useful framework in which
current organizational theories and technologies can be assimilated and
.

m;

worked into a comprehensive diagnostic and application model or
algorithm.

It is felt that such an approach, when refined, could form

the basis of a new professional discipline.
As envisioned, this professional discipline would take on the
characteristics of organizational medicine.
became practicing organizational doctors.
exists.

The professionals would
Currently no such equivalent

Organizational development practitioners, for the most part,

are specialists in a given area of expertise and tend to prescribe the
same treatment with which they are most familiar, regardless of the
organizational malady.

The treatment result is unpredictable and often

with costly results to the organization and degrading of the consultant
profession.
The goals for the organizational triage (OIR) process were
selprted to address these current weak areas that oculd act to increase
client confidence and the ultimate value of organizational consultants.
Specifically, the goals of the triage process are to:
1).

facilitate the prompt return to normal functioning of an
organization?
155

156
2) .

provide such correction at the least cost to the
organization;

3) .

minimize the damage to the organizational menbers; and

4) .

provide an efficient medium through which organizations can
avail themselves of technology to ensure an organization's
survival.

To provide the actualization of these goals, a comprehensive
algorithm needs to be further developed that can act to guide the
diagnoses and the structuring of treatment.

The objective of such a

comprehensive algorithm must not sinply confine the organizational
intervention specialist to a mechanical directing of the client
organization through the algorithm.
If the consulting profession follows such a route, the
professional succumbs to the myopia of the technician and the vision of
a legitimate and respected profession will never be realized.

A true

organizational consultant must continually broaden his/her inquiry and
scope of knowledge in order to develop and expand the field of OTR and
increase the predictability of its application.

The more OTR

specialists learn about the interactions of organizational elements and
how they become misaligned, the greater the value of the intervention
process.
Ultimately organizations will select and rely on their cwn
"organizational physician," much as they new rely on their cwn
attorneys.

The organizational practitioners must work to legitimately

extend their influence beyond quick fix interventions and became long-
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terra advisors to organizational growth and development,

ihe result

will be more productive and healthier organizations as the are
specialist operates at the opposite end of the oonflict spectrum from
the legal profession.
The objective of the OIR effort is to create maximum
organizational harmony and synergy through the alignment of often
conflicting or competing elements.
It is the opinion of this student that an "organizational medical
profession" would not only have the personal attraction and benefits of
the medical profession, but have such without the negative of having
one's patient ultimately dying.

The organizational practitioner also

has the value added of being able to positively influence numerous
individuals simultaneously with each treatment.
As a developing discipline, many see the financial and
professional opportunities.

The result is the development of a

plethora of psychological and organizational diagnostic instruments,
software systems, staff development programs, and consulting
specialists.

The practitioners dedicated to making this a profession

must resist the urge to utilize every test available and apply the
latest theory to inpress the client or to entice a potential client
into participating in the latest "fad" treatment.
A profession, however, needs to be built on solid theory and time
tested with experience.

Not unlike the medical profession, the

newcomer to organizational development must recognize that the
profession is still a practicing art and not a science.

Craftsmanship
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only cones with experience and exposure to a wide range of
organizations.

The organizational development profession should look

at the medical profession as a general role model in terms of
development and certification of qualified personnel.
A system of internships would be of real value beyond basic
education.

All too often an individual joins a corporate firm out of

graduate school as an internal consultant which does not provide
hinv/her with an opportunity to see hew different organizations operate
from various perspectives.
Besides the potential for developing an actual discipline, the
theory, as developed, has other potential applications.

Any end user

that has the need to assess or predict the probability of an
organization to evolve into a crisis state or even termination would
benefit from this theory application.
More specifically, it would be of value to any investment
institution whose loan is at potential risk.

From an organizational

perspective the current practice of investment institutions using
financial statements as the sole predictor of organizational future
health is tenuous, at best.

The financial statement, as a report, is a

snapshot in time, is descriptive of past performance, and documents the
amount of assets available to infuse into the organization, if needed.
The greater the assets, the longer an organization can be in a state of
decline and the lower the risk of termination during a loan period.
However, this financial report does not suggest organizational "health"
or probability of organizational decline.

The model, as presented,
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iJTtroduoes an additional variable, organizational alignment, as a
predictor of future organizational performance.
Another potential application would be the creation of a new
insurance product line similar to life insurance for individuals.
Venture capitalists could have their exposure or their unsecured
investment insured for a given term by talcing out insurance.

The

insurance company could use the model to rate the risk, not unlike fire
insurance.

As the misalignment and potential for degeneration

increases, the rating will increase and the premium will be adjusted to
cover the risk.

This would be of the most value to newly forming

business efforts that do not have a track record that the commercial
banks can use, and allows private investment to become more attractive
in that the base investment would be insured, even if they were an
unsecured creditor.
Another application could be a screening process for the employer
or employee as to closeness of fit or alignment between a new job and
the individual.

With the cost of relocation of professional employees

now often over fifty thousand dollars plus the risk to the two-income
family, a cross-country move is no longer casual.

All parties have an

obligation to be sure that the fit will wear well over the long-term or
at least long enough to offset the investment.

This alignment theory

provides such guarantee, as already experienced by this student.
Last, the process can help an organization calculate its liability
exposure and provide adequate defense in discrimination and civil
rights violation cases.

This student is increasingly being requested
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to testify as an expert organizational witness in both state and
federal courts.
Although the theory, as developed, and model generated are rather
extensive, the development process generated a series of questions.
Seme of these questions suggest some areas for additional research and
inquiry as follows.
Research needs to be conducted on the ability of conventional
theories of leadership, conflict resolution, decision-making,
ccraiunication and time management, to explain behavior during the pre¬
crisis and crisis periods of organizational decline.1

We do not know

clearly hew the styles of management are affected under crisis
conditions.
Miles2 stresses in his book that the public sector needs to
develop a new cadre of leaders who will develop a process and will
aggressively respond to declining resources.

This would be a fertile

area for research.
Another area for research is to develop better organizational
diagnostics to make sense of how events evolve and the interactions
between elements.

Seme theorists such as Bougon, Weick, and Binkjorst3

initially looked at causal mapping as a creative methodology to trace
events.

This student has found this to be of interest and suggests

ijehn R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates, The
Organizational t.i fe cycle (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass
Inc., Publishers,

1981), p. 369.

2Ibid., p. 361.
3Ibid.
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further research and afplicaticn of causal mappirq could be of real
value.
As presented in this dissertation, hew managers respond to initial
signals of misalignment problems or crisis events often determines the
level of managerial skill and effort that is needed to address the
crisis event.

However, a research topic of value would be why do seme

managers deny and procrastinate while others react decisively?

if this

response variable could be better understood, one might be able to
suocessfully address the misalignment forming even before it becomes
too large for normal managerial skills to resolve.
Ihere has been little consistent agreement or consensus in the
literature regarding the inpact of organization degeneration and the
acceptance of innovation.

Some suggest one of the benefits of

organizations in crisis is the receptivity to innovation (Lirdblcm,
1968, and Glassberg, 1978),4 while others—Smart and Vertinsky, 1977;
and Bozeman and Slasher 1978—and this student's experience suggest
innovation is paralyzed along with a manager's fear of failure.5
More research needs to be conducted on how the initial
misalignment really is initiated or triggered.

Miller (1955), in his

"general theory for the behavior sciences" argued that all "living
systems respond to continuously increasing stress first by a lag in
response then by an over-compensatory response, and finally, by

4Ibid., p. 370.
5Ibid.
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catastrophic collapse of the system. "6

These and other theories need

to be further tested.
In essence, the whole body of knowledge about organizations in
decline and in crisis needs to be developed.

The significant increase

of interest in organizations in crisis in the period since this student
started this dissertation is a most positive sign.

As the interest

grcws, the research will follow.
In conclusion, the primary focus of this student's continued
research will be in testing out and refining his triage

i and

assessment algorithm.
Typical of rigorous research and academic inquiry, more questions
are raised than are answered.

However, this dissertation effort does

offer the following conclusions.
-

Organizations can often be reversed in their decline given the
proper intervention technology is applied.

In other words,

organizations do not have to parallel the human organism where
death must ultimately occur within a rather fixed time frame.
-

Intervention with organizations that are in crisis requires a
different treatment process than normally used for refining and
developing healthy organizations.

-

Organizations degenerate due to their inability to create a new
equilibrium resulting from an inadequate change effort due to
one or more change inhibitors being in operation.

6J. G. Miller, Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences
(American Psychologist,

1955), p. 27.
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To identify a successful intervention process to reverse a
declining organization, the focus needs to be placed on
realignment of "dominant elements" that cause or set-up a
condition for decline.
-

Effective treatment of organizations in crisis most often
requires external intervention.

-

An organization in crisis must first be stabilized before
successful turnaround efforts can begin.

-

"Surgery1' of individuals, task areas, processes, or products is
often a required intervention to reverse a declining
organization.

-

Under crisis conditions time is critical and is often the enemy
which requires the intervention strategy to be as efficient as
possible which is the focus of organizational triage as an
intervention model.

Hopefully, this dissertation effort will provide the impetus for
further research efforts that, taken collectively, can someday form the
basis of a recognized and respected profession.
this dissertation is dedicated.

It is to this end that
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